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ABSTRACT 
This study, conducted over the period April 1978 through November 1978,
addresses four issues relevant to SPS costing and selection of preferred SPS 
satellite configurations: 
1. 	 Consideration of economic factors in the SPS system studies that 
relate to selection of SPS satellite configuration 
2. 	 Analysis of the proper rate of interest for use in SPS system
definition studies 
3. 	 Study of the impacts of differential inflation on SPS system 
definition costing procedures 
4. 	 Utility interface and SPS baseline design. 
The first three issues are discussed in this volume. The fourth issue is discussed in 
Volume 2 of this report. 
A cost-risk comparison of the Rockwell International and Boeing CompanySPS satellite configurations showed a significant difference in the levelized cost of power from them. It is concluded, from the assessment reported herein, however,
that this difference is the result more of differences in the procedures for
assessing costs rather than in the satellite technologies required or of any
advantages of one satellite configuration over the other. On the other hand,however, a real advantage of the Boeing SPS development program does appear
over the Rockwell SPS development program. This advantage is primarily due to 
the fact that the Boeing SPS development program contains one additional decision 
point prior to the commitment of the rajor fraction of the development funds. 
Analysis of the proper rate of interest for use in SPS system definition
studies leads to the conclusion that the appropriate rate of discount is 4 percent.
This rate of discount is justified by examining both the real cost of capital to thefederal government, that is, real interest rates on U.S. treasury bonds, and the
opportunity costs of capital measured in terms of real pretax return on assets
obtained by 1600 major U.S. corporations. This rate of discount is also in keeping
with federal policy on energy conservation. 
A procedure is presented for SPS cost estimating taking into accountdifferential inflation that is likely to occur between now and the time that SPS
would- be implemented. The major item of differential inflation to be expected 
over 	 this period of time is the real cost of labor. This cost is likely to double 
between today and the period of SPS construction. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
 
During the period January 1975 through March 1977, ECON, Inc., teamed 
with Arthur D. Little, Inc., Grumman Aerospace Corporation and Raytheon 
Company, performed an economic study and assessment of Satellite Power Systems 
(SPS) for the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center. As a part of this study 
ECON determined the range of likely costs for electric power from SPS and, based 
on these results, developed an economic rationale for proceeding with an SPS 
development program. In the conduct of this work an economic evaluation 
methodology was developed appropriate to long-range energy projects such as SPS. 
This methodology recognizes explicitly the uncertainties inherent in research and 
development of long-range energy alternatives and deals with them directly. To 
begin with, uncertainties are quantified using a risk analysis computer model. Then 
the results of the risk analysis are used in a decision analytic evaluation of 
candidate SPS development programs. This methodology is particularly suitable as 
an aide to the selection of preferred SPS satellite configurations and the 
formulation of corresponding SPS development programs. 
The above study also identified a number of key economic issues relevant to 
the development and selection of preferred SPS satellite configurations. In a 
follow-on study to this work, beginning in August 1977, ECON addressed three such 
related issues: the effect of an SPS development program on optimal fossil fuel 
consumption patterns, a study of the benefits attributable to alternative uses of 
SPS technologies and a study of the electric power market penetration of SPS. 
This study was completed in January 1978 and provided interesting new insights to 
a number of critical economic issues relevant to SP'S. 
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As a result of the above studies, a number of -economic factors affecting the 
satellite power system, its development, design and costing, were identified. Four 
of these issues are addressed in the study reported here. This study was conducted 
over the period April 1978 through November 1978. The issues covered include the 
following: 
1. 	 Consideration of economic factors in the SPS system studies that 
relate to selection of SPS satellite configuration 
2. 	 Analysis of the proper rate of interest for use in SPS system 
definition studies 
3. 	 Study of the impacts of differential inflation on SPS system 
definition costing procedures 
4. 	 Utility interface and SPS baseline design including: 
a. 	 Receiving antenna site selection 
b. 	 Power pooling issues 
c. Implications for SPS design. 
Results of the study-on issues 1 through 3 are reported in this volume. Study 
results on issue. 4 are reported in a second volume authored by Arthur D. 
Little, Inc. 
1.1 	 Economic Factors Relating to Selection of SPS Satellite Configurations 
Two candidate SPS satellite configurations were examined in detail in this 
study. These include the 5 GW gallium aluminum arsenide solar cell SPS 
configuration developed by Rockwell International under contract to the George C. 
Marshall Space Flight Center and a 10 GW silicon solar cell SPS configuration 
developed by the Boeing Company under contract to the Johnson Space Center. A 
risk analysis model was developed for each of the two above configurations. The 
model made use of the data generated by the respective contractors to provide 
cost-risk data on both satellite configurations. The cost-risk model follows the 
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work breakdown structure established for the SPS by the Marshall Space Flight 
Center. Documentation of the cost-risk models for these two SPS satellite 
configurations is provided in Appendices B and C of this report. 
In addition to the cost-risk modeling described above, the proposed SPS 
development programs for each of the two configurations were also analyzed. 
Parametric data on this analysis are presented, showing the economic value of the 
respective development programs as a function of the busbar of price of energy 
from competing alternatives, in Figure 1.1. Based upon the data provided by the 
contractors and the assumptions made in the performance of the analysis, the 
break-even busbar price of energy on January 1, 1999 is shown to be in the range of 
20-35 mills/kWh (1977), not including taxes or insurance. The Rockwell Inter­
national configuration and development program was further analyzed para­
metrically in terms of the learning rate on SPS system costs and the differential 
escalation rate in the busbar price of power from competing alternatives. 
In performing the risk analysis, a number of inconsistencies between the 
Rockwell and Boeing works were uncovered. The area of inconsistency of most 
concern to this study involves the procedure and assumptions used in costing SPS 
system components. Cost estimates for SPS system components represent 
forecasts or predictions of the future and as such cannot be precise. Varying 
rationales by which such cost estimates are obtained lead to significantly different 
results. As a result, the projected costs for the Boeing and for the Rockwell SPS 
systems, on a levelized cost of energy basis, are significantly different. We believe 
that this difference is due primarily-to these inconsistencies and not to any 
inherent differences in the satellite system itself. Thus, a major recommendation 
deriving from this study is that further SPS costing should be developed by a cost 
analysis committee consisting of representatives of both contractors and NASA and 
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including also a qualified economist or operations research individual to assure that 
cost ground rules and cost estimates are internally consistent and are consistent 
with mathematical and economic theory. 
1.2 Rate of Interest for Use in-SPS System Definitions Studies 
An analysis of the appropriate rate of interest for use in SPS system 
definition studies was conducted and the results derived from this study were used 
in a preliminary evaluation of the Rockwell International SPS satellite configu­
ration to illustrate the differential impact of the recommended discount rate 
compared to the 7.5 percent discount rate used in SPS studies to date. The 
appropriate rate of discount was determined by bounding the problem from two 
sides. On the low- side, the actual cost of capital to the government was 
considered. The risk-free standard for the real cost of capital to the government 
is measured by the interest rate on U.S. treasury bonds corrected for inflation. 
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While during recent periods this interest rate has occasionally been negative, over 
the past several years it has tended to lie in the region of I to 2 percent. 
On the high side, the discount rate is bounded by the opportunity cost of 
capital. This cost is measured most appropriately by the rate of return on assets 
generated by industry, corrected for the effects of inflation. This rate, measured 
by examining the prdf it and loss sheets for 1600 U.S. corporations over the past 15 
years, has recently tended to be in the range of 5 to 6 percent. The argument for 
use in SPS system definition studies furtheran appropriate rate of discount for 
draws upon the work of Von Neumann, performed in the 1930s. Von Neumann 
demonstrated that, in a linear economy, the maximum stable rate of discount is 
equal to the rate of technological innovation. Over the past 50 years or so, this has 
per year. Thus, it is concluded that antended to be slightly above 3 percent 
for use in SPS system definition studies would lieappropriate rate of discount 
between 3 and 5 percent, with this range representing the approximate resolution 
of this range, is theof this study. Consequently, 4 percent, or the midpoint 
This rate of discount is also compatible with anrecommended rate of discount. 
a
overall federal policy of energy conservation. Such would not be the case at 
7 to 10 percent rate of discount. 
Costing1.3 Impacts of Differential Inflation on SPS System Definition 
Procedures
 
The effects of inflation on SIPS system definition costing procedures was 
First, it is argued that system costing can appropriately be done usinganalyzed. 
fact that the time period ofconstant year dollars. However, because -of the 
construction of the SPS is 20 to 50 years in the future, it is additionally desirable 
to account for expected trends in specific sectors of the economy which will result 
as a whole. Thein differential inflation between these sectors and the economy 
6 
procedure advocated divides costs into three economic categories: labor, resources 
and capital. Costing procedures in each category are defined separately. 
It has been observed that over the past 100 years the productivity of labor 
has increased steadily at a rate slightly over 3 percent per year. This continued 
increase in productivity has resulted in increasing real compensation for labor, that 
is, increasing real wage rates. If previous trends continue, this will result in 
roughly a doubling of the cost of labor between the present time and the early 
period during which the SPS construction would commence. Thus, the cost of labor 
should be differentially inflated accordingly. 
The cost of capital is discussed in detail as a separate task in Section 3 of 
this report and reviewed above in Section 1.2. The recommended real cost of 
capital for SPS system definition, and costing is 4 percent per year. Variations 
about this number, however, are likely to occur, thereby resulting in a component 
of uncertainty in the total SPS cost. 
Finally, resources are dealt with. Many resources required for SPS construc­
tion and operation are found in abundance. The major question with respect to 
these resources is only how one should estimate their price for the time period of 
interest. It is suggested that long-term average prices are perhaps a good guess, 
but that the historical volatility in price should also be examined as an indication 
of the likely uncertainty in the present ability to forecast these prices. Other 
resources may be scarce or depleting. For these resources, it may be appropriate 
to consider the cost of alternative resource supplies or, particularly in the case of 
energy resources, to explicitly account for economic rents attributable to depletion 
of the resource in question. 
In any case, considerable uncertainty exists in any estimate of resource costs 
for the time period of interest. 
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2. COST-RISK AND PROGRAMMATIC ANALYSIS OF 
CURRENT SPS SATELLITE CONFIGURATIONS 
The purpose of the cost-risk analysis described herein is to determine the 
current state-of- knowledge that exists on candidate SPS system configurations: a 
determination which is a necessary ingredient of the comparison of alternative SPS 
satellite configurations. First, the risk analysis output reflects explicitly--if it is 
conducted properly--a measure of the effect of component technology uncer­
tainties on system performance and cost. Second, risk analysis allows a proper 
identification of those technologies which are critical to the development of an 
economically efficient system, a process of identification which is not possible by 
means of a nonstatistical analysis. The proper identification of critical tech­
nologies is a vital part of the development of efficient, candidate SPS R&D 
programs. Third, risk analysis results are a necessary input to decision making and 
program evaluation. The methodology which is used to conduct cost-risk analyses 
and to employ the results in programmatic evaluations is reviewed below. Readers 
wishing more detail than is provided here are referred to Chapter 3 of "Space-
Based Solar Power Conversion and Delivery Systems Study--Volume V, Economic 
Analysis,"* which provides a more detailed description of the theoretical basis for 
the techniques applied here. Following the review of the methodology, the results 
from the analysis of the two candidate SPS configurations developed by Rockwell 
International and the Boeing Co. are presented. 
Prepared for NASA George C. Marshall. Space Flight Center under Contract 
No. NASS-31308 by ECON, Inc., March 31, 1977. 
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2.1 Methodology 
2.1.1 Cost-Risk Analysis 
The purpose of the risk analysis described herein is to provide a computa­
tional tool for statistical system costing. The output of the risk analysis is a 
probability distribution of system costs (capital investment, operation and 
maintenance, and total life cycle). The necessary components of the risk analysis 
include an engineering system model, a cost model and data which describe the 
current state-of- knowledge on the system. The engineering system model must, 
to the appropriate level of detail, reflect the interrelationships of the various 
system components, such that, when one of the physical parameters is varied, all of 
the adjustments necessary to accommodate that change are reflected in the new 
output describing the system and its performance. For example, if solar cell 
efficiency varies from a nominal value, the size (hence, total mass) of the solar 
array varies as well, and this change in solar array size must be calculated along 
with corresponding changes in total satellite mass, the requirements for space 
transportation (hence, transportation cost), and so on. 
At the level of analysis presented here, system relationships are mostly 
represented by linear approximations or scaling laws which, while they work fairly 
well owing to the fact that many portions of the SPS system scale in a linear 
fashion over reasonable ranges, are, nonetheless, an approximation that must be 
recognized. The system masses are generally calculated as functions of area or 
power throughput, with areas and power throughputs being determined by the 
efficiencies of the power conversion and distribution elements of the system. The 
series of power conversion steps in the SPS system may be characterized as an 
efficiency chain, a generalized version of which is presented in Figure 2.1. Most of 
the system components of the SPS satellite and ground station are related directly 
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to the efficiency chain. Other components are more directly correlated to total 
SPS satellite subsystems. 
The cost model translates the output parameters of the engineering system 
model (such as the total mass, size or power throughput of subsystems, the total 
number of launch vehicle flights to LEO, etc.) into estimates of the total system 
cost. The general logic flow of the interaction of these two models is depicted in 
Figure 2.2. The cost models employed in this analysis are formulated to calculate 
the production and operations and maintenance (O&M) costs for a single unit, in 
this case the "theoretical first unit" (TFU). While the comparison of TFUs of 
different configurations is a convenient approach, to do this it is necessary to 
apportion the costs of equipment which is used for the construction of more than 
one satellite appropriately among the satellites constructed by such equipment. To 
accomplish this apportionment of costs, the cost models calculate annuities at the 
prescribed discount rate to repay the cost of each piece of equipment over its 
design life. This annuity is then divided equally among all of the satellites 
constructed in one year. In this manner, the cost of equipment common to the 
construction of more than one satellite is properly accounted for in the cost of 
each satellite. However, it is only direct charges such as transportation and 
assembly costs which are attributed to each satellite, not sunk costs such as R&D 
costs. Other assumptions involved in the engineering system model and the cost 
models used in the analyses here are described below. 
The final component necessary to c6nduct a cost-risk analysis is a set of data 
to characterize the current state-of-knowledge about the technical and economic 
parameters of the system under consideration. The possible range of values for any 
of these parameters is typically represented as a probability distribution which is 
0­
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the subjective assessment by those knowledgeable about a factor assigning proba­
bilities to each value within the range of possible values. If a risk assessment is 
conducted properly, the minimum value for each parameter distribution will be set 
at a value for which there is "very low" probability of the actual value occurring 
below that minimum value in the distribution; likewise, the maximum value should 
be set such that there is "very low" probability that the actual value will be found 
to exceed that maximum value in the distribution. The maximum likelihood point 
in the distribution should correspond to the current "best estimate," again 
subjectively assessed by experts, and the shape of the distribution should reflect 
the current state-of-knowledge in that the more sharply peaked the distribution is, 
the greater the degree of confidence in the estimate of the parameter value. 
Conversely, a flatter distribution would reflect a lower degree of confidence in the 
estimate. This latter degree of sophistication in risk analysis (the shape of the 
input parameter distributions) could not be employed within, the scope of the 
current effort. The actual distributions used are shown in Figure 2.3. For the 
purposes of this analysis the shape of the distribution depends upon the position of 
the most likely value within the range of values. 
One method for performing a risk analysis involves a Monte Carlo simulation 
on the engineering system and cost models, that is, random sampling is conducted 
to produce a deterministic set of input data for the two models and the resulting 
system cost (or other otput parameter) is stored. The process is repeated until it 
has been determined by statistical means that a significant output sample has been 
generated. This risk analysis procedure is depicted below in Figure 2.4. The 
results of a risk analysis are conveniently presented as cumulative distribution 
functions, showing the probability of a-given output parameter, such as total unit 
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cost, being less than the indicated amount. While the output parameter distri­
bution functions dearly result from the use of subjective probability assessments 
as inputs, that is, they are not derived from the sampling of actual events, they do 
provide an interesting, and probably the best available, basis for comparison of 
aalternative system configurations, in that a risk comparison explicitly includes 
description of the uncertainty which exists on each system configuration cost 
estimate. The usual alternative to risk analysis is & simple "point estimate" of cost 
and other parameters. Presented only with point estimates of, say, the installed 
cost per kilowatt of competing electrical generation technologies, a decision maker 
is deprived of any indication of how reliable these estimates are, that is, of what 
the likelihood is that each estimate will be met or exceeded. Risk analysis creates 
a framevork in which subjective judgment may be incorporated at the most 
appropriate level (component by component) and accounted for in a mathematically 
F5, (fru 
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correct fashion. Therefore, if the risk analysis is conducted properly, the results 
will be an accurate reflection of what is really known about any 'given system and 
what the total effect is of what is not known on estimates of system performance 
and cost. And so long as risk analyses of competing systems are conducted in a 
consistent manner, comparison of the results will be far more enlightening from 
the standpoint of program decision making than the comparison of point estimates. 
2.1.2 Identification of Critical Technologies 
The framework for cost-risk analysis outlined above provides a mechanism 
for assessing the individual technology elements which comprise the present 
state-of-knowledge. Technology elements are critical to the current state-of­
knowledge if, given perfect information on them, this information could substan­
tially influence decisions regarding the system development and implementation. 
For the SPS it is assumed that programmatic decisions will be keyed, among other 
conditions, to the total life-cycle costs of a single SPS. Therefore, a technology 
element is critical if it alone can have a significant effect on the cost-risk profile 
(meaning both risk- -the slope of the risk curve--and expected cost). 
To determine the impact of a technology element on the risk profile, one 
assumes that perfect information on the technology element can be made 
available. In terms of the input variables to the risk analysis model, perfect 
information is expressed as a deterministic value or spike distribution for that 
variable. However, the value that any particular variable will ultimately assume, 
between the minimum and maximum limits estimated as a part of the cost-risk 
analysis, cannot be known in advance (that is, today). Thus, it is necessary to input 
deterministic values for each technology element, one at a time, over the range 
from the minimum to the maximum possible values for each variable to determine 
the range of potential outcomes from the information-gathering process. In the 
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work performed here, each input variable is assigned three deterministic values 
corresponding to "the minimum, most likely and maximum values which the 
parameter takes on in the cost-risk analysis. All other input data remain 
unchanged. Critical technologies are then identified by observing the variables 
which had the largest effect on the expected value and standard deviation of the 
total life-cycle cost probability distribution. 
It is interesting to compare this approach for the identification of critical 
technologies to the deterministic approach more often used and referred to here as 
a sensitivity analysis. In a sensitivity analysis one produces a deterministic cost 
estimate of the system by the use of a system cost model. Then, one by one, the 
input variables to this cost model are varied from their nominal values to 
pessimistic or worst-case values. The effect that this has on the total system cost 
is then noted and the critical technologies are identified by observing which input 
variables have the largest influence on the total system cost. Unfortunately, this 
procedure, while simpler than the risk analysis outlined, is mathematically 
incorrect and can lead to substantially wrong ansviers. This is so because of 
nonlinear interactions between variables in the model each of which contain some 
uncertainty. Consider the simple example where the cost is given as the product of 
two variables A and B. And consider the case when the distributions representing 
the current state-of-knowledge on A and B are as shown in Figure 2.5. Due to the 
long tail nature of the distribution on variable B the risk and cost sensitivities to 
variable A are greatly enhanced. Under a case of simple nonlinearities such as that 
illustrated here it is not uncommon for a deterministic analysis to underestimate 
the criticality of the state-of-knowledge on variable A by a factor of two or more. 
Risk analysis thus provides a mathematically correct basis for identifying 
technologies critical to the development of an SPS. In general, one would expect 
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that these are the technology elements that should be addressed early in a research 
and development program so that an improved state-of-knowledge will be available 
for future programmatic decisions. 
2.1.3 Decision Analytic Approach to Program Evaluation 
A key purpose which the decision maker serves in a research and development 
program, such as the SPS program, is to assure that the technology is successfully 
developed (if that is possible within schedule and budget constraints) while 
simultaneously minimizing exposure to risks. This is accomplished by segmenting 
the overall research and development program into a number of discrete phases. 
During each phase of the program, research and development activities are carried 
on with the aim of providing information for subsequent decisions within the 
program. The subsquent decisions can be to continue the program as planned, to 
terminate the program or to alter it in some substantial way. It is precisely this 
process of sequential information buying that enables a program manager to 
control risk by not pursuing those technologies which appear to be dead-ended and 
instead to focus project resources on those technology areas which promise the 
most payback. 
The information provided by a cost-risk profile of an SPS configuration can 
be used as a basis for the evaluation of a particular R&D program. The evaluation 
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uses a decision analytical procedure with the cost-risk data as an input. The 
procedure for such an evaluation is outlined in Figure 2.6. A particular R&D 
program is defined in terms of the experiments to be conducted in each phase of 
the program directed at "buying information," that is, the reduction of uncertainty 
about the technical and economic parameters of the system. Also defined are the 
"decision points" where the program is evaluated and either continued, redirected 
or terminated, based upon the information developed during the preceding phases 
of the program. The costs associated with each phase of the R&D program must be 
estimated, as well as the expected improvements in the state-of-knowledge on the 
system resulting from the experiments conducted. These expectations of improve­
ments in the state-of-knowledge are expressed in this work as expected percentage 
reductions in the uncertainty (standard deviation, for example, of the distribution 
of each parameter) to be achieved as of each decision point. Furthermore, an 
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implementation scenario must be defined in terms of the number and scheduling of 
operational units to be produced. For purposes of the evaluation, the program is 
expressed as a decision tree with each branching point corresponding to a decision 
point and each branch correspondingto a potential decision. The original cost-risk 
profile for the system is used as a prior distribution of total life-cycle cost for the 
system. It represents everything that is known about the system today. Decision 
rules are needed to determine, at each decision point, whether to continue or 
terminate the program (more complicated decision trees may be formulated 
involving parallel technology development efforts and the like; however, the 
analyses here have been formulated on a simple go/no-go basis at each decision 
point). The decision rule applied here is that at each decision point the 
state-of-knowledge extant must meet a technology target which corresponds to a 
linear improvement in the 80 percent confidence bound for the technology from the 
current state-of-knowledge to the "break even" cost for the TFU. This is the cost 
of the TFU for which there is exactly zero net present value for the entire program 
(present value of costs equals present value of revenues). If the technology 
development is such that the 80 percent confidence technology bound remains 
under the 80 percent confidence technology requirement throughout the develop­
ment 	program, then the development program, will be a success. 
To calculate the expected value of a program, risk analyses are performed on 
the data for each decision point reflecting the expected percentage reductions in 
the range of uncertainty on each parameter. The resulting standard deviations of 
the state-of-knowledge on the total life-cycle cost are used along with the 80 
percent confidence technology target described above to create cumulative distri­
* 
butions which represent the decision rules. Using a process described in detail in 
These distributions are assumed to be Gaussian and therefore may be uniquely 
specified by a mean value (which may be derived from the 80 percent 
confidence value) and a standard deviation. 
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Appendix G of the previously cited report* the prior probabilities of each decision 
point are calculated. The prior probabilities represent the likelihood of proceeding 
successfully at each decision point. The decision tree itself is evaluated by 
weighting successively the value of each branch (taking costs to be negative and 
revenues positive) by the probability of reaching that branch and then summing the 
expected value of each branch to arrive at the expected value for the entire 
program represented by the decision tree. The results from such programmatic 
evaluations can be used to rank SPS program and cQnfiguration alternatives. In the 
"zero budget" sense, if a program has a positive expected value, then one is 
economically justified in undertaking the first phase of that program. If more than 
one program option has a positive value, the one with the highest expected value is 
the one that is economically preferred. Again, the reader who wishes a more 
detailed description of the theory and application of these techniques to SPS 
program evaluation is referred to the previously cited report. 
When confronted with a cost-risk profile, many program planners become 
very concerned with the potential that such a system has to incur very large costs 
for its production, that is, with the long tail of the distribution ranging up to rather 
high costs. Such concern however, is the result of a misunderstanding of the role 
of the program manager. It is, in fact, the purpose of the program manager to 
insure that the program would be terminated in a timely manner if in fact it 
becomes evident that the actual system costs will lie toward the upper end of the 
cost range as opposed to the lower end. It is the opportunity posed by the 
probability that the cost could lie at the lower end of this range that the program 
manager should seek to capitalize upon. Thus, a properly structured research and 
See footnote on page 7. 
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development program is one which offers the opportunity to buy information to 
determine what the system will, in fact, cost when all research and developments 
are completed, to proceed with the program if, at any point, it is economic to do 
so, or to terminate further work on the project as soon as it becomes clear that 
this is the economic choice to make. 
2.1.4 	 Assumptions and Ground Rules for a Consistent Comparison of 
Alternative SPS Configurations and Programs 
The sources of information for the components of the cost-risk analysis and 
the major assumptions used in constructing the models are reviewed in Figure 2.7. 
Models of the two system configurations to be analyzed were derived first from 
contractor reports and then verified through two series of discussions with 
contractor personnel responsible for the design work. The NASA Work Breakdown 
Structure (NASA TM 781551, 3anuary 1978) served as a guide for the organization 
and reporting of the engineering system and cost models. The assumptions 
employed in the programmatic evaluation are listed in Table 2.1, including: unit 
size, lifetime, availability and output power level; fleet size, implementation rate 
and cost reduction learning curve; discount rate; price of power and price of power 
escalation rate; and taxes and insurance. It should be noted that the results of the 
analyses in the next two subsections below depend upon the assumptions made. 
Changes in the assumptions may change the conclusions. Thus, while the insights 
gained may be valuable, decisions should be based on this analysis only after a 
thorough review of the models, the data representing the current state-of­
knowledge and the assumptions made for the analysis. 
Some modifications were made to the input data obtained from the 
contractors, in order to assure, where possible, that the same costs and 
performance characteristics were being assumed for similar equipment. Therefore, 
adjustments were made in the efficiency chains for the two systems to reconcile 
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TABLE 2.1 PROGRAMMATIC EVALUATION ASSUMPTIONS
 
* 	 END-OF-LIFE POWER OUTPUTS OF 5 GW FOR THE ROCKWELL CONFIGURATION AND 10 GW FOR THE BOEING
 
CONFIGURATION ARE USED FOR REVENUE CALCULATIONS
 
o SATELLITE LIFETIME IS30 YEARS 
a EACH UNIT IS PRODUCING POWER 95 PERCENT OF THE TIME 
* 	 INITIAL OPERATION DATE (IOD) OF THE FIRST UNIT IS ONE YEAR LATER THAN THE IOD OF THE PROTO-

TYPE IN EACH PROGRAM; THE IMPLEMENTATION RATE FOR THE ROCKWELL CONFIGURATION IS FOUR SATEL-

LITES CONSTRUCTED PER YEAR, AND THE IMPLEMENTATION RATE FOR THE BOEING CONFIGURATION IS
 
TWO SATELLITES PER YEAR
 
e 	 THE TOTAL FLEET SIZE FOR THE ROCKWELL CONFIGURATION IS 120 SATELLITES (INCLUDING THE PROTO-

TYPE) AND FOR THE BOEING CONFIGURATION IS 60 SATELLITE (INCLUDING THE PROTOTYPE)
 
THE COST OF THE SUBSEQUENT UNITS IS RELATED TO THE COST OF THE TFU BY A 90 PERCENT LEARNING
 
RELATIONSHIP
 
o 	 DISCOUNT RATE IS4.0 'PERCENT 
* 	 REAL PRICE OF ELECTRICITY AT THE BUSBAR INCREASES 1 PERCENT PER YEAR, BEGINNING WITH A
 
PRICE OF 30 MILLS/kWH AT THE IOD OF THE FIRST UNIT
 
* 	 NO CHARGES WERE COMPUTED FOR TAXES OR INSURANCE
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differences, so that both configurations were analyzed with the same efficiency 
chain. For similar types of equipment, the same proportional ranges were used to 
express the uncertainty on related input parameters; however, no adjustments were 
made in the "most likely" estimates for these parameters. The only other 
adjustments which were made were to set the design lives of the space construc­
tion bases to 30 years for both configurations. These changes represent only those 
necessary to eliminate the most obvious inconsistencies in design estimates for the 
two systems. It did not fall within the scope of this effort, nor would there have 
been sufficient definition of engineering assumptions for.the two configurations to 
rectify all of the differences which exist between the two configurations in 
analysis, design and cost estimation of similar equipment. 
2.2 An Evaluation of Rockwell SPS Configuration and Program Plan 
The Rockwell International SPS configuration and program plan which were 
subjected to cost-risk and programmatic evaluations are described in "Satellite 
Power Systems (SPS) Concept Definition Study," Final Report, April 1978, prepared 
for the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center under contract NASS-32475. The 
werebasic features of this system are reviewed in Table 2.2. The models which 
developed to represent the Rockwell configuration in the risk analyses conducted 
here are listed in Appendix B. The data corresponding to the input variables of 
these models are found in Appendix D. For simplicity in review and comparison, the 
engineering and cost equations are presented in a unified format using the NASA 
Work Breakdown Structure (NASA TM 78155, January 1972) as a guideline. The 
relationship, between the accounts listed in the Work Breakdown Structure and the 
models used to analyze the two SPS configurations is depicted in Figure 2.8. Once 
* again, it is noted that the research and development costs are not amortized over 
.the satellites constructed, as this approach would not represent the actual timing 
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TABLE 2.2 	ROCKWELL SPS CONFIGURATION AND
 
CONSTRUCTION SCENARIO
 
a 	 ALUMINUM STRUCTURE
 
* 	 GALLIUM-ALUMINUM ARSENIDE SOLAR CELLS
 
* 	 CONCENTRATION RATIO = 2.0
 
o 	 END-OF-LIFE POWER OUTPUT AT THE BUSBAR = 5 GW 
o GEO FABRICATION AND ASSEMBLY
 
a ELECTRIC CARGO ORBIT TRANSFER VEHICLE (INDEPENDENT)
 
o 	 HORIZONTAL TAKE-OFF, SINGLE-STAGE-TO-ORBIT WINGED HEAVY
 
LIFT LAUNCH VEHICLE
 
of the decisions and the incurring of costs. Rather development costs are taken 
into account in the programmatic evaluations. The Initial Capital Investment 
Account in the NASA WES corresponds directly to the TFU Cost Models reported in 
the Appendices. The distinction in the NASA WBS between the Replacement 
Capital Investment and Operations and Maintenance accounts is useful for the 
purposes of computation of taxes and insurance. However, as neither taxes nor 
insurance are considered in this analysis, the two accounts have been combined into 
a single O&M model for each configuration. 
A cost-risk analysis was conducted on the Rockwell configuration using the 
methodology described above, employing the models listed in Appendix B. The 
current state-of-knowledge for each input parameter (in terms of minimum, 
maximum and most likely values) is listed in Appendix D. The resulting cost-risk 
profile is shown in Figure 2.9. The nominal case shows an expected value TFU cost 
of about $33 billion (1977 dollars) and a minimum value of about $.19 billion. This 
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cost-risk profile reflects far less risk (variability)than one might expect for a 
technology in the state of development of SPS with the leadtime that is necessarily 
involved (at least 20 years before commercial implementation). The sensitivity of 
this estimate of the current state-of-knowledge to an alternative view of the 
current state-of-knowledge is reflected in the curve, also shown in Figure 2.9, 
depicting an assessment of higher risk on only two variables. If one adjusts merely 
the high-side risk for solar cell specific cost and mass, that is, merely changes the 
worst case values for these two parameters to those reported in an Arthur D. 
Little, Inc. analysis, leaving the best and most likely values unchanged, the cost 
profile is radically altered. Indeed, the expected value in the case acknowledging 
higher risk on two input values is more than twice that of the nominal comparison 
case. 
The critical technologies for the Rockwell configuration were analyzed in the 
manner described above in Section 2.1.2. Each of the parameters which is thought 
to have a potentially significant effect on total system cost is-set deterministically 
first to its maximum value, then to its most likely value, and finally to its 
minimum value, allowing all other parameters to vary freely (according to their 
defined probability distributions) in the simulation. This analytical approach 
simulates the effect of perfect information on the variables being examined, so 
that the effect on total system cost variability resulting from the variability of 
each parameter may be measured. Thirty-four parameters were examined for 
their effect on system cost and risk. Those parameters having the greatest effect 
on system cost and risk, that is, the major 'cost and risk driving factors for this 
configuration are listed in Table 2.3. Three basic areas of concern are indicated by 
Space Based Solar Power Conversion and Delivery Systems Study, Final 
Report, Volume IV, Energy Conversion Systems Studies, prepared for ECON, 
Inc. by Arthur D. Little, Inc. under Contract No. NASS-31308, March 29, 
1977. 
TABLE 2.3 THE EFFECT OF COST AND COST RISK OF CHANGES IN THE
 
STATE-OF-KNOWLEDGE OF THE ROCKWELL CONFIGURATION
 
RANGE OF VALUES, $ BILLIONS (1977)
 
BEST MOST LIKELY WORST
 
MAJOR COST AND RISK
 
DRIVING FACTORS MEAN COST COST RISK MEAN COST COST RISK MEAN COST COST RISK
 
NOMINAL CASE 33.29 6.34 
SPECIFIC COST OF THE SOLAR BLANKET 28.99 4.36 30.37 4.58 45.54 7.60 
SOLAR CELL EFFICIENCY 28.55 4.26 33.99 5.86 40.21 8.18 
DC-RF CONVERTER EFFICIENCY 31.28 5.47 32.72 5.74 40.32 7.28 
RATIO: COST OF MICROWAVE ANTENNA 
ELEMENTS TO DC-RF POWER 
THROUGHPUT 29.68 5.91 33.19 6.20 38.09 6.65 
PHASE CONTROL EFFICIENCY 31.50 5.74 32.29 6.65 35.44 7.92 
ANTENNA POWER DISTRIBUTION 
EFFICIENCY 31.22 5.38 32.13 6.04 36.82 7.54 
BEAM COLLECTION EFFICIENCY 31.70 5.90 33.19 6.12 36.89 7.08 
UNIT COST OF CABLE ATTACHING 
MACHINES 33.36 5.94 34.30 6.56 37.98 6.38 
"COST RISK" IS THE STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE COST ESTIMATE.
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this listing of cost and risk drivers. First, uncertainty about the cost and 
efficiency of the gallium-aluminum arsenide solar cells has the greatest effect of 
all the parameters examined. Second, uncertainty about a number of charac­
teristics of the microwave transmission system, including conversion efficiencies 
and klystron costs, has a significant effect on system cost and risk. Third, the 
cable attaching machine, a fairly numerous and moderately expensive piece of 
assembly equipment, is found to be the element of the construction scenario whose 
uncertainty contributes most significantly to overall cost and risk. 
A programmatic evaluation was conducted following the decision analysis 
techniques described above. A decision tree representation of the Rockwell 
development plan described in Volume VII and the Appendices of the aforemen­
tioned Rockwell report is shown in Figure 2.10. This program calls for a variety of 
ground- and space-based technology verification experiments to be conducted, 
during the first phase. Flight tests, where necessary, will utilize the Shuttle. 
During the second phase a I GW prototype is constructed and, after a demonstra­
tion period, is expanded to a full-scale 5 GW plant. The final phase entails 
commercial implementation. The scope of this study did not allow a more detailed 
representation for the purposes of this programmatic evaluation because, while a 
more detailed program plan is described in the Rockwell report, it is necessary to 
subjectively estimate the improvements in state-of-knowledge on each parameter 
that is likely to occur as of each decision point. A means did not exist at this level 
of analysis to discern with greater resolution than is represented in Figure 2.10 the 
stages of the program with their accompanying improvements in states-of­
knowledge. Based upon the previously stated assumptions underlying this analysis, 
the Rockwell program shows a substantial positive expected value, on the order of 
$324.billion (1977 dollars) present value as of January 1, 1980. The sensitivity of 
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this result to the underlying assumptions is discussed below. For the moment, it 
should be noted that probabilities'associated with decision points B and C are quite 
high. These high probabilities of success at each decision point are the result of 
several factors. First, the relatively modest risk reflected in the cost-risk profile 
shown above for this configuration results in a series of technology targets which 
are not very demanding relative to the current state-of-knowledge. Second, the 
relatively low discount rate (which is only appropriate if a valid risk assessment has 
been conducted, as noted in Section 3) allows for a greater proportion of the value 
of the fleet revenues to be counted in defraying the cost of building the fleet. The 
correspondingly higher "break-even" cost further reduces the rigor of the 
technology targets for the program, thus increasing the probability of success at 
each decision point. Third, the lower discount rate used here shifts the "prior 
distribution" of unit costs down by reducing the cost of capital applied to each unit 
over the period of its construction. Such a reduction in the prior distribution of 
unit cost improves the chance of success at each decision point. These latter two 
effects relating to discount rate are described, in more detail in Section 3. 
2.3 An Evaluation of the Boeing SPS Configuration and Program Plan 
The Boeing Co. SPS configuration and program plan which were subjected to 
cost-risk and programmatic evaluations are described in "Solar Power Satellite 
System Definition Study--Part III," March 1978, prepared for the Lyndon B. 
Johnson Space Center under contract NAS9-15196. The basic features of this 
system are reviewed in Table 2.4. The models which were developed to represent 
the Boeing configuration in the risk analyses conducted here are listed in 
Appendix C. The data, corresponding to the input variables of these models are 
found in Appendix E. As with the Rockwell models described above, the 
engineering and cost equations are presented in a unified format using the NASA 
WBS as a guideline. 
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TABLE 2.4 	 BOEING SPS CONFIGURATION AND
 
CONSTRUCTION SCENARIO
 
o 	 COMPOSITE STRUCTURE 
o 	 SILICON SOLAR CELLS 
* CONCENTRATION RATIO = 1.0 
a END-OF-LIFE POWER OUTPUT AT THE BUSBAR = 
10 GW 
* 	 LEO FABRICATION AND PREASSEMBLY; FINAL
 
ASSEMBLY AT GEO
 
e 	 ELECTRIC CARGO ORBIT TRANSFER VEHICLE 
(SPS-POWERED) 
* 	 VERTICAL TAKE-OFF, TWO-STAGE WINGED
 
HEAVY LIFE LAUNCH VEHICLE
 
The results of the cost-risk analysis of the Boeing configuration are shown in 
Figure 2.11. The Boeing cost-risk profile exhibits both the same modest assess­
ment of risk and the extreme sensitivity to changes in input variable distributions 
that the Rockwell cost-risk profile does. The expected value for the Boeing 
configuration TFU is about $40 billion (1977 dollars) with a minimum value of about 
$25 billion. However, if the high-side risk for the solar cell parameters (specific 
cost, mass and efficiency) is changed to reflect the previously cited Arthur D. 
Little, Ini. analysis of worst values for space-qualified, mass-produced silicon 
solar cells, leaving the best and most likely values unchanged, the expected value 
for TFU cost increases by more than a factor :of two. The implications of this 
extreme sensitivity to alternative assessments of the current 'state-of-knowledge 
is discussed below. 
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A critical technology assessment was conducted on the Boeing configuration 
in the manner described above (see the methodological description and review of 
the results of the corresponding analysis on the Rockwell configuration). Forty­
nine parameters were identified as having potentially significant effects on system 
cost and risk. Thirteen of these parameters were determined to be major cost and 
risk drivers as a result of the critical technology assessment. These major cost and 
risk drivers are listed in Table 2.5. In addition to the solar blanket and microwave 
transmission system characteristics which were identified as major cost and risk 
drivers of' the Rockwell system, the payload mass and the operations cost of the 
HLLV and the cost of electric thrusters for self-powered orbit transfer were 
identified for the Boeing configuration. Except for these latter factors, there is a 
complete overlap of the critical technologies identified for both systems. 
Data were gathered to conduct two programmatic evaluations. The first 
program included a first phase of ground-based technology development, a second 
phase of flight testing using the Shuttle, a third phase consisting of the construc­
tion of a minimum cost commercial prototype using a Shuttle derivative instead of 
the HLLV and without tooling for full-scale commercial implementation until after 
the success of the commerical prototype. The second program differed in that the 
commercial prototype was built using the HLLV and the space bases that would 
then be used to build the entire fleet of SPS satellites, that is, in the second 
program, development of the HLLV and the space construction facilities occurs 
before the building of the commercial prototype satellite. When these two 
programs were analyzed, there was found to be no significant difference between 
them. This result is probably due to the fact that the cost savings of .not 
developing an HLLV earlier was largely offset by the higher transportation costs 
incumbent with the use of a Shuttle derivative instead. Similar offsetting costs 
TABLE 2.5 	 THE EFFECT OF COST AND COST RISK OF CHANGES INTHE
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MEAN COST COST RISK MEAN COST COST RISK MEAN COST COST RISK 
40.06 7.02 
34.44 5.35 36.65 5.51 54.32 7.57 
37.65 6.76 39.31 7.29 47.52 9.04 
36.18 6.19 39.23 7.42 44.46 7.54 
36.60 7.48 38.13 6.91 44.41 7.32 
36.76 6.08 38.18 6.96 44.13 8.34 
37.74 6.68 38.91 7.78 43.46 7.86 
37.69 6.98 39.83 7.30 43.26 8.34 
37.10 6.48 39.98 7.35 42.31 7.95 
38.17 7.29 39.50 7.42 43.19 7.83. 
38.69 6.96 39.54 7.18 43.61 8.93 
38.37 6.78 39.59 7.45 43.21 7.78 
39.37 6.41 38.76 7.14 44.17 8.44 
38.58 7.64 40.12 7.63 43.12 7.89 
"COST RISK" IS THE STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE COST ESTIMATE
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occurred in the area of space construction. Owing to the fact that there is no real 
difference between the expected value of the two programs, only the results of the 
anlaysis of the second program, which corresopnds more closely to the Rockwell 
program for purposes of comparison, will be presented here. This second Boeing 
development program is represented as a decision tree in Figure 2.12. The 
expected value of the program is substantial and positive ($570.5 billion (1977) 
present value as of January 1, 1980), for the same reasons as pertained to the 
Rockwell program. To wit, the modest assessment of system risk and the low 
discount rate applied in this analysis combined to produce virtual certainty of 
success at each decision point. It should be noted that the low discount rate used 
in this analysis is appropriate only ifa valid risk assessment has been conducted. 
This requirement is described in further detail in Section 3. 
2.4 Comparison and Conclusions 
The cost-risk profiles of the Boeifig and Rockwell configurations are 
compared on an installed cost basis in Figure 2.13. An unthoughtful examination of 
the data presented in these cost-risk profiles would lead one to the conclusion that 
the Boeing configuration is very likely to be the less costly alternative. In fact, 
the cost differences are not likely to be statistically significant and are likely to be 
due to differences in the people who made the estimates. This is a type of 
"calibration" error described in an important article by Harrison [11. Whereas it is 
important to model systems such as SPS at an appropriate level of detail so that 
the basic probability assessments being conducted are done so on a level that is 
easily grasped by the participants, it is precisely this practice which, according to 
Harrison, "opens up the possibility of series error through unwarranted indepen­
dence assumptions." Harrison concludes, "Whenever an analyst does things right, I 
believe that he must worry to some extent over the potential effect of the decision 
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maker's uncertainty about his own calibration." The fact that the "critical" 
technologies are much the same for both configurations and that cost-risk analyses 
of both configurations exhibit extreme sensitivity to alternative assessments of the 
current state-of-knowledge tends to support the conclusion that much of the 
difference between the cost estimates presented here is actually due to calibration 
errors among the individuals making the underlying estimates. Consequently, it 
would be highly desirable for a panel of experts to be established to support the 
development of consensus on the basic technical and economic issues underlying a 
cost estimating procedure such as that required for SPS., It is also highly desirable 
that such a panel have available the services of an economist or operations 
research scientist to assure that a consistent, mathematically correct framework is 
established within which to elicit expert opinion. 
A second conclusion which can be drawn from an examination of Figure 2.13 
is that, in spite of the substantial positive expected values calculated for both 
configurations above, neither configuration has a sufficiently high probability of 
being economic to justify commitment to an entire SPS development program prior 
.to substantial reduction of existing uncertainties. This can be accomplished with 
further studies, analyses and technology programs which, at the proper level, 
appear economically justifiable under the existing state of uncertainty. 
Economically successful SP5 development will depend upon successful completion 
of the various component technology programs. It should be noted that the 
deterministic estimates of the cost of the two systems lie at the tip of the 
low-side tail of the cost-risk profiles for the two systems. Further, both cost-risk 
profiles demonstrated considerable sensitivity to alternative expert estimates of 
the current high-side risk on solar cell parameters. These continue to remain 
inconsistencies inthe evaluation of system costs and the risk analysis procedures 
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used by both NASA contractors seem to fall short of properly evaluating the 
uncertainty existing in many, if not most, cost elements.. If the uncertainty 
"associated with other system parameters besides solar cell efficiency, cost and 
mass were equivalently evaluated, the cost-risk profiles may well turn out to be 
much "flatter" than even those shown above for the higher risk cases, with 
expected values possibly considerably higher than those shown in Figure'2.13. 
The sensitivity of the programmatic evaluations to several of the assumptions 
on which the analyses are based was conducted. The expected value of the 
Rockwell program is charted in Figure 2.14 as a function of both the assumed rate 
of escaration for the price of power and the rate of learning applied to the costs of 
successive SPS units. It is clear from this figure that the economic value of SPS 
programs is extremely dependent upon both of these factors. Consequently, the 
value of information provided by the next phase of SPS development will be highly 
dependent upon the expected price of power and the rate of power price escalation 
in the year 2000 and beyond. Furthermore, if rates of learning as high as the 90 
percent learning curve assumed in the programmatic evaluations here or higher are 
to be used, justification will have to be forthcoming in terms of production 
scenarios and techniques which allow for such learning from unit to unit. A more 
conservative 95 percent learning relationship substantially reduces the expected 
value of the program, and as the assumed rate of power price escalation declines, 
the value of the program actually becomes negative. Another assumption 
underlying the programmatic evaluations which was examined was the implemen­
tation rate; however, this factor was found to have very little effect on program 
expected value compared with the effect of the assumed rates of learning and 
power price escalation. 
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3. 	 THE PROPER RATE OF INTEREST FOR USE IN SPS 
SYSTEM DEFINITION STUDIES 
The social rate of interest, or the discount rate, is a key parameter in the 
optimization of SPS system design. It is also a widely misunderstood and misused 
parameter. The purpose of the work reported here is to establish and substantiate 
a recommended rate of interest for use in SPS system definition studies. 
Several theorists argue that the social rate of time preference is the relevant 
parameter in advocating the social rate of discount. Most economists, however, 
recognize private sector rates of return as opportunity costs for government 
investment. Such arguments have led to the recommended 10 percent rate by the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
In light of tecent private sector performance, a 10 percent rate appears 
considerably too high. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show some bond yield and interest rate 
statistics for the 20th century (Figure 3.1) and over the last 13 years (Figure 3.2). 
The important point to notice is that the nominal rates in the late 1960s and early 
1970s are high--higher than those which have prevailed historically--but the real 
rates have remained consistent with or lower than historical levels. In looking for 
a "true" measure of the cost of capital to the government, as argued by Stockfisch 
[2], it would be hard to find a better candidate than the return on treasury bonds, 
the vehicle by which the federal government finances its debt. Since 1965 the real 
rate of return on treasury bonds has not exceeded 2.5 percent per year. On the 
other hand, however, since OMB's recommended rate was based in part upon 
evidence of industry performance records, it is also appropriate to examine this 
performance over the last several, inflation-ridden years. 
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The only data available for examination of industry performance are profit 
and loss statements which have been prepared in accordance with Internal Revenue 
dollar values for taxService guidelines. These guidelines dictate the use of current 
accounting. Furthermore, they were established during and for a period of 
relatively low inflation and no particular care was taken to assure that they would 
provide an accurate measure of real (corrected for inflation) performance. But the 
objective here is, in fact, to establish real performance. Hence, these profit and 
loss data must be adjusted to account for the distorting effects of inflation on real 
performance as measured by the profit and loss statements prepared under IRS 
Thus, the bulk of the discussion below centers on identifying theguidelines. 
corporate performance and thedistortions which inflation causes in reported 
correction of these distortions to yield real performance data. It is not the intent 
here to criticize or even critique the IRS guidelines, but merely to adjust the 
available data to correct for inflation. 
3.1 Methodological Background 
3.1.1 	 Depreciation, Capital Formation and Inflation: Nominal Versus 
Real Depreciation 
physicalDepreciation is an artificial acounting tool whereby the costs of 
are spread over subsequent accountingassets 	 acquired in one accounting period 
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periods according to the "useful" lifetime of the assets. For example, a firm 
spends $30 million in '1975 for new machinery that will be in use for ten years. The 
money is spent in 1975, but the machinery is not used up in the process of 
generating 1975 production. Depreciation allocates the $30 million investment 
against the production revenues that will be obtained over the ten years the 
machinery is used. 
Depreciation thus allows the recovery of funds to make up for the initial 
investment of resources. Depreciation is a valid "cost" in measuring corporate 
performance in a current year, whether or not the recovered funds are actually 
used to replace the asset at the end of its useful life. Asset values not yet 
depreciated are carried forward to future years. The concept of depreciation is 
recognized in U.S. tax law and procurement regulations, which define depreciation 
broadly as a "reasonable deduction" for the wear-and-tear on capital stock in a 
given accounting period. Funds recovered by such deductions should assure the 
corporation of the opportunity to make a similar investment at the end of the 
useful life of the asset. 
Figure 3.3 describes the current accounting procedures invovled in the 
acquisition of additional capital stock. In this example, a firm acquires $30 million 
worth of new machinery. Of the total, $10 million is funded through depreciation. 
The remaining $20 million is funded half by debt ($10 milion) and half by issuing 
new shares to raise equity ($10 million). Had there been no inflation over the past 
ten years, '$10 million worth of the newly acquired machinery would replace 
equivalent machinery bought ten years ago at a cost of $10 million. The other $20 
million would be correctly measured as added capital stock, providing new capacity 
for corporate growth. This is the way U.S. accounting rules determine depreciation 
and new capital formation--without regard to inflation. Obviously, these 
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accounting rules and regulations were formulated during a period of monetary 
stability. 
When one looks at the same transaction and assumes a 10 percent annual rate 
of inflation, a completely different picture emerges. Table 3.1 illustrates the 
effect; it shows th6 follow : 
Column A: The ten years of the asset history. 
Column B: The annual nominal depreciation under existing U.S. 
accounting procedures. In this case the straight line depreciation 
methods is employed and depreciation is listed at $1 million a year, or 
one-tenth of the original value of the $10 million worth of machinery 
acquired ten years~ago. 
Column C: The reacquisition cost of the asset at the end of each year, 
assuming a 10 percent rate of inflation. After ten years it would cost 
$25.9 million to replace the original $10 million worth of machinery. 
Column D: Depreciation computed on the basis of the reacquisition 
cost in Column C rather than on the original cost. (Other methods 
suggest that the price the corporation might realize for the machinery 
on the market could be used as a depreciation base.) 
Column E: The overstatement of profits resulting from the use of 
nominal rather than real depreciation costs. Over the ten year period, 
the corporation will report a total of $7.6 million in profits which are 
not really profits; they are in fact part of the cost of capital, that is, 
depreciation. 
Column F: The corporate income taxes On that portion of the profit 
that has been overstated due to the use of nominal depreciation 
charges. Over the ten years the corporation will pay $3.6 million in 
taxes on profits which in fact do not exist. 
Column G: The dividend distributions that the corporation will make, 
based on overstated profits. The 27 percent figure roughly represents 
available dividend taxes and retained profits. 
Column H: The retained portion of the overstated profit, amounting to 
a total of $1.9 million over the ten-year span. 
Had there been no inflation during the period covered in the table, each of 
the columns D through H would "zero out." The fact that positive entries are 
shown is due to the illusory effect of inflation when capital assets are evaluated in 
terms of original costs. 
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TABLE 3.1 FINANCIAL HISTORY OF A CAPITAL ASSf--TEN YEAR IISELIFE 
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
 
AZSUMflTIONS A ~usanIonprimeSI0 
Expected uselde 10 yesrs 
Rate of infiation 10 percent annually 
Corporate income tar 48 perent 
25 Percent of profits before taxes retained; blancediributed 
A B C D E F G H 
R..cotuiono 	 Ditrbuted RetainedCot 

Calculalon O"rstaied Corporat Ovematac[Yea Annally Profit Income Tax O rild 10isAnnually 11F Inflation 10 -5 48% on PfonAsset Prie Depreciation -C 27%on E 25%on E 
1.0n S 11.0 $ 1.1 $ 0.1 .048 $ .027 S .026 
2 1.0 12.1 1.2 0.2 .096 .054 .050 
3 1.0 13.3 1.3 0.3 .144 .081 .075 
4 1.0 14.6 1.5 0.5 .240 .135 .125 
5 1.0 16.1 1.5 0.6 .288 .162 .150 
6 1.0 17.7 1.8 O.B .384 .216 .200 
7 1.0 19.5 2.0 1.0 .480 .270 .250 
8 1.0 214 2.1 1.1 .528 .297 .276 
9 1.0 236 24 IA .672 .373 .350 
10 10 25.9 2.6 1.6 .763 .432 .400 
z S0.0 a $ nt S$ 7.6 S3.600 S2100 $1.900 
TEN YEAR SUMMARY: Reacousition price $25.9 
Total overstated profit S7.6 
Tax pa~d on oversvled wofai $3.6 
Distributed overstated profit $2.1 
Total cash outflow due io overstated profits $5.7 
In summary, the table shows: 
* 	 An overstated profit of $7.6 million 
o 	 Payment of $3.6 million in corporate income tax on the over­
stated profit 
* 	 Distribution of $2.1 million in dividends 
" 	 "Equity" amounting to $1.9 million in retained profits. 
Figure 3.4 shows the new picture of the transaction that emerges when real 
cost accounting, which considers the 10 percent inflation factor, is employed. To 
maintain its productive base by replacing the original $10 million worth of 
machinery, the corporation now has to lay out $25.9 million. Thus, in investing the 
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earlier-mentioned $30 million, the corporation incurs $10 million in new debt and 
has to issue new shares for $10 million, but $25.9 million of the $30 million goes to 
replace the original $10 million worth of 1965 vintage machinery. Only $4.1 
million is net added investment. The new financing needed in addition to available 
depreciation funds to replace the 1965 machinery--$15.9 million--represents an 
erosion of corporate assets. Where the prices of products are also determined by 
"historical" costs, or by government-regulated pricing procedures (exemplified by 
public utilities, Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, and the Department of Energy), investments for maintaining the 
capital base for the production of these products cannot be continued for long. 
The current U.S. practice of historical depreciation causes extensive 
distortion in the accounting process. Real depreciation, based on reacquisition 
costs, must be used to insure a correct reflection of market principles and prices. 
3.1.2 	 Monetary and Real Capital 
In the minds of the public and also of some economists, the term capital 
denotes wealth, posessions, money, plant and equipment. However, in the context 
of capital and capital formation in an economic system, two fundamentally 
different terms of "capital" have to be distinguished: 
o 	 Real capital denotes physical goods in the form of machinery, 
plant and equipmdnt which are used with labor to produce goods 
and services. Since these items are quite often used beyond a 
single accounting period--say one year--the term durable goods is 
often used synonymously for real (production) capital. 
* 	 Monetary capital denotes simply any accumulation of paper bills or 
ent riesonbankingaccounts which conveypurchasingpowerorpotential 
title to dispose of resources, that is, labor, equipment, plant or 
consumer goods. 
Even 	though in market economies, except in times of crisis, monetary capital 
can readily be exchanged into real capital through purchases, the two terms are 
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strictly different. When account entries cannot be changed into paper bills and 
paper bills cannot be transformed into goods and services, the crucial distinction 
between real capital and monetary capital is clearly discernible. 
Monetary capital can instantly be transferred worldwide at little cost. On 
the other hand, real capital in the form of equipment, plants, transport fleets and 
networks may take months, years or decades to transfer, and some forms of real 
capital, such as interstate highways and other "fixed" investments, can never be 
transferred. This distinction is most apparent today in the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries. While highly endowed with financial capital 
amounting to billions of dollars, it is extremely difficult--if not impossible--for 
them to obtain real capital within their boundaries. During the years in which this 
transfer of real capital is taking place, they hold only paper or account entries. 
These distinctions between monetary and real capital are emphasized because 
of their importance in understanding real capital formation in any economic 
system. Monetary savings in an economic system is not the same as real capital. 
Real capital is formed only if new plants and equipment are produced, procured and 
put into productive use. While accumulation of monetary capital can be equated 
with savings, there is no reason why such savings must lead to the creation of real 
capital--an assumption all too readily made by macroeconomists. Such savings 
may- be diverted into the public sector and may be used instead for defense 
expenditures, local, state or federal government services or lost by inefficiencies 
in nonmirket services. 
3.1.3 Interest, Debt, Equity and the Cost of Capital 
In the context of determining the "true" profitability of firms in an economy 
with inflation, several factors have to be considered before interfirm comparability 
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of real rates of return are possible--in addition to the depreciation cost adjust­
ment. First, the debt to equity ratio between firms can vary widely. While the 
debt and equity structure of the firm simply has to do with the ownership of the 
enterprise--a matter of book entries and legal documents having little if anything 
to do with the substantive flow of resources and revenues to the firm--this 
differing ownership structure is recognized in a totally distorted and misleading 
way in today's U.S. accounting and tax practices: interest paid on debt, that is the 
cost of outside financing, is recognized as a cost, while the interest cost on the 
equity portion is treated as profit--that is, as if provided to the firm "free of 
charge." This leads to seriously distorted profit and loss reports from firms that in 
fact (that is, in substance, real flow or resources) show identical performances. A 
firm financed 100 percent by equity may show a profit of 9 or 10 percent on its 
account while the identical firm financed 100 percent by debt could show zero 
profit--or even a loss--depending on the conditions at which it can obtain 
financing. In the former case the firm would have the "privilege" of paying 
corporate income tax on its "profit," while in the latter case no tax liability to the 
firm arises. This in turns leads to an overdue emphasis of "self-financing" through 
retained profits as well as an overexpansion of investments by firms that are 
heavily equity financed. 
The economically correct way of accounting for profit is to allow also for an 
interest cost for the equity portion of a firm's financing, something long and widely 
advocated and implemented, for example, in German Cost Accounting Standards. 
To correct for this arbitrary distortion in U.S. accounting procedures, the total 
fixed charges (that is, interest payments and related expenses) are added back into 
gross profits before calculating rates of return on assets irrespective of the 
financial structure of firms. Through this method, the real gross rate of return on 
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total assets for each firm, and for each sector of U.S. industry, is calculated in the 
program used in this study. 
Second, in addition to depreciation cost adjustment and the adjustment for 
fixed charges, other losses occur to any firm in an inflationary economy: to the 
extent that any firm needs a minimum of monetary assets to conduct its business 
these nominal, monetary holdings are subject to the erosion of inflation. In the 
calculations performed it is assumed that the monetary asset structure of firms is 
efficient in the sense that no substantial reduction could be obtained in those 
monetary assets without endangering the conduct of business by that firm. This 
simplifying assumption has to be made for purposes of this analysis; otherwise each 
firm would have to be analyzed case by case to determine the optimum monetary 
asset balances needed and it would only be on those optimum balances that losses 
due to inflation could and should be computed. This task is clearly beyond the 
purposes of this exercise. 
Third, additional losses through inflation occur to the firm on inventories held 
by the firm again in the conduct of its business: the acquisition of inventories two 
or three months in advance of sales again leads to arbitrary, fictitious profits 
included in today's profit and loss account which would not be shown were it not for 
inflation. To determine the inventory-related fictitious profit a detailed analysis 
of each firm and its inventory structure would be needed. A fair approximation of 
the inventory-related fictitious profits can, however, be obtained by determining 
the turn-over rate of sales to inventories: the higher the turn-over rate, the 
smaller the inventory in relation to total sales transacted by a firm, and the 
smaller the inflation-related distortion of profits. With the adjustments of 
inventory losses by. the turn-over rate of inventory, fictitious profits due to 
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inventory valuation were also adjusted for under the "fully impacted" earnings 
calculations for each firm, and for each sector of U.S. industry. 
3.2 Results 
The results of the inflation impact analysis show clearly that reported 
(nominal) returns by industry significantly overstate the real returns being earned. 
For example, in 1977 while reported annual returns on assets (ROA) were 
12.9 percent (asset-weighted average for 1600 corporations in 25 industries), the 
actual return on assets was only 6.1 percent. Further, it was the asset owners, 
those who held equity in the corporations, who suffered the most due to inability to 
depreciate properly: while adjustments for inflation dropped ROA by 6.7 percent 
(roughly equal to the increase in the consumer price index), returns on equity fell 
from 12.1 percent down to 1.2 percent when adjusted for inflation. Clearly the 
lenders are only feeling the first-order effects of inflation while the equity holders 
are bearing the brunt of the inadequate asset-depreciation burden. The disturbing 
results found in terms of real rates of return on equity is an additional finding that, 
for purposes of this analysis, can be ignored but which, in a larger context, has to 
be addressed in economic accounting and tax practices. One should not, however, 
advocate such low or even negative rates of return for purposes of evaluating 
public investment projects. The rates of return on assets are the relevant results 
and these indicate real interest rates of about 6 percent, as stated. 
Table 3.2 shows actual and reported earnings and returns on assets and equity 
for 25 industries for 1977. In general, nominal returns on assets deviate from the 
actual by approximately the rate of inflation, while returns on equity were more 
severely affected. Table 3.3 shows actual returns on assets and equity for the 
25 industries for 1974-77 and real return rates on treasury bonds for those same 
years. 
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TABLE 3.2 REPORTED AMD ACTUAL (FULLY ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION) PERFORMANCE
 
RECORDS, BY INDUSTRY FOR1977 FOR160D COMIPIES 
I PERFOPMANCERECORDS 1fILLI(S OF DOLLARS ORPERCENT PER YEAR) 
ACTUAL RflURh 
EARNINGS C$) EARNINGS () ON EQJITY () ON EQUITY (%) O1 ASSETS (S) ON ASSETS (1) 
INDUSTRY REPORTED REPORTED ACTUALRETURk REPORTED RfTUX ACTUALRETUR 
AGRCICLTURE 2.92 -0.75 5.69 -3.86 9.03 4.47
 
HIKING 13.51 0.97 6.72 0.29 8.20 
 1.88 
DRILLING AND 
EXPLORATION 24.89 7.10 14.47 2.40 17.96 9.97 
IUILDERS A'ND 
CfrtSTRUC'I l 17.33 7.01 16.55 4.27 12.59 7.69 
FOO 32.22 1.138 13.02 3.50 14.69 8.46 
TOBACO 129.11 92.12 14.44 8.37 15.38 12.21 
TEXTILE AMD 
LUMBER 17.56 1.38 11.83 0.49 12.59 4.84 
PRINTING 18.63 9.73 14.59 5.72 18.47 12.02 
CHEMICALS 
MD DRJGS £3.24 23.50 14.54 3.42 15.14 8.19 
REFINING AD 
ROOFING 293.22 28.15 13.33 0.58 18.11 9.15 
RJSER AND 
PLASTIC 14.03 -4.90 9.25 -1.81 11.22 4.34 
GAS, CLAY 
AD CEMENT 22.S4 2.58 12.70 076 11.99 4.87 
IRO AND STEEL 11.08 -35.79 2.83 -4.00 3.56 -1.23 
RDARE 8.08 1.09 14.15 1.13 15.19 6.92 
DCHIIKERY 45.74 15.80 16.44 4.14 17.87 10.38 
ELECTRIC 25.92 8.31 15.0 3.04 14.32 8.11 
CARS, TRUCnS 
MND AIRCRAFT 79.13 32.12 16.43 4.38 16.19 9.41 
INSTRUMNTS 35.53 19.00 14.70 6.03 18.52 11.96 
JEWELRYANO 
6.72 0.40 
RAILS 84.22 15.82 8.64 0.72 7.51 3.06 
TRANSPORTATION 17.29 -7.20 13.46 -2.41 9.54 2.19 
MU4MICATION 32.13 m.51 12.00 -0.51 11.35 3.54 
UTILITIES 49.98 16.04 11.28 1.37 9.70 4.81 
MOC.ESALE 10.05 3.73 14.s0 .80 12.68 7.92 
RETAIL 20.34 6.90 12.80 2.69 12.81 7.16 
s  12.06 0.4 14.52 7.17 
TABLE 3.3 ACTUAL RETURNS ON ASSETS, EQUITY AND REAL 
RETURNS ON TREASURY BONDS, 1974-77 
RETURN; ON RETURN ON RETURN ON 
ASSETS* EQUITY* TREASURY BONDS
 
PERCENT PER YEAR
 
1974 6.3 0.5 -3.0 
1975 5.1 -0.6 0.3
 
1976 5.9 1.1 2.0 4g 
01977 6.1 1.2 0.4 

ASSET-WEIGHTED AVERAGES FOR 25 INDUSTRIES.
 
., 
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Based upon these considerations, the use of a 10 percent discount rate is 
clearly unwarranted for the evaluation of long-term projects, that is, projects lor 
which the return on investment is realized many years into the future. High 
discount rates strongly favor the selection of short-term projects and nearly doom 
competing long-range projects, despite the potential benefits offered. When risks 
have not been properly accounted for (for example, the risk that a component may 
cost ten times as much as estimated, or the risk that the system will not work at 
all), it has been argued that the use of a high discount rate such as 10 percent is 
justified as a type of risk premium, accounting for the improper or incomplete 
assessment. This point underscores the need for the use of proper risk assessments 
in the evaluation of long-range energy R&D, for such projects cannot bear the 
burden of the higher discount rate. 
Given that the I to 6 percent range established above is rather wide, where 
within this range would one advocate as "the" social rate of discount? As treasury 
bonds are very liquid and compete with regulated bank interest rates, their rates of 
return might be somewhat too low. On the other hand, return rates on corporate 
assets contain a risk premium, probably beyond that which is appropriate for public 
project evaluation. Still further, Von Neumann [3] gave a mathematical proof 
that, in an expanding, linear, economic system, the real rate of interest is less than 
or equal to the real rate of technological growth of that system. As that proof has 
remained unrefuted since 1937, it stands as an argument for advocating a discount 
rate approximately equal to the growth rate of the economy, between 3 and 
4 percent. The rate of interest thus recommended here for use in SPS systems 
definition studies is 4 percent, the midpoint of the range of 3 to 5 percent which 
represents the "resolution" of the results obtained above. It is important to note 
that this represents a "risk-free" interest rate, that is, that comparisons or 
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evaluations made using this rate should include an explicit risk assessment. The 
separate consideration of these two factors, is demonstrated in an example below. 
One of the major impacts of this recommended interest rate is that it 
enhances the economic value of all long-range energy RD&D, including SPS. In the 
evaluation of energy research, some of the benefits which result, particularly from 
research into long-range technologies, are realized several decades from now. The 
use of high discount rates almost totally denies any value to pursuing such 
research, not only today but also in the future since the long lead times required 
between the earliest development and implementation will remain. As an example 
of the limitations which a high discount rate places upon energy R&D, consider two 
hypothetical projects, A and B, the former of which provides immediate returns 
with no risk and the latter of which provides returns which, while substantially 
greater in dollar value than the other project's, are offset in the future and are 
subject to uncertainty. This uncertainty in returns may derive either from 
uncertainties in the technical performance of the system or from uncertainties in 
the markets for inputs and outputs of the system. Figure 3.5 shows the comparison 
of the value of these two projects at a high discount rate (10 percent) and a lower 
discount rate (5 percent). The total area for Project B (both shaded and unshaded 
areas) shows the potential return of B, and if risk were not taken into account, 
Project B would clearly be more desirable than Project A at either high or low 
discount rates because its potential return exceeds that of Project A in both cases. 
However, as noted in the foregoing discussion, the issue of the effect of 
uncertainty on the value of a program should be dealt with separately from the 
effect of interest rates; consequently, it is the expected value of projects which 
must be compared, that is, the potential payoffs weighted by the corresponding 
probabilities of success. When the potential return of Project B is weighted by its 
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probability of success (50 percent), then Project B's expected value (unshaded area 
only) is lower than the expected value of Project A at a discount rate of 
10 percent, in spite of the fact that Project B offers a return that is five times 
greater in (undiscounted) dollar value. Clearly, it is the high discount rate that 
makes Project B appear less desirable. When a lower discount rate (such as the 5 
percent used in this example), appropriate for situations where risk is considered 
explicitly, is employed in the comparison, then Project B offers a higher return, 
even after risk has been accounted for. 
A somewhat more realistic representation of the effects of different discount 
rates on the revenues (benefits) of an SPS implementation program is shown in 
Figure 3.6. Under the assumption of 120 five GW satellites, each having a lifetime 
of 30 years, being built at the rate of four satellites per year starting in 1996, and 
producing power whose price escalates in real terms at the rate of 1 percent per 
year, a revenue profile like the one shown in Figure 3.6 would be generated. 
Overlaid on this revenue profile are trajectories representing the ratio between the 
value of the revenue stream in a given year to its corresponding present value in 
1980, at discount rates from I to 10 percent per year. The diagram demonstrates 
the dramatic effect that high discount rates have on the value of future revenues: 
for instance, in the first year that satellites are constructed (1996), any revenues 
accruing that year would be worth, expressed as a present value in 1980, only 20 
percent of their value in 1996 at a 10 percent discount rate, whereas revenues from 
that year would retain over 50 percent of their value (again, expressed as a present 
value in 1980) at a discount rate of 4 percent. The situation is even more dramatic 
in 2026, the year in which the satellite fleet is completed, when only about I 
percent of the value of revenues from that year are reflected in a 1980 present 
value if discounted at 10 percent, whereas a still significant 16 percent of the 
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value of the revenues would be reflected in a 1980 present value if discounted at 4 
percent. 
The effect described above of a larger percentage of revenues (benefits) 
"clearing the hurdle" of a lower discount rate is a major determining factor in the 
difference in expected values of an SPS program evaluated at different discount 
rates. The exponential nature of the discounting process, as reflected in the 
curvature of the trajectories of value in Figure 3.6, takes a particularly high toll 
when operating at high rates over the long period of time involved in the 
implementation of SPS. Another aspect of the exponential nature of discounting is 
that the "upfront" costs, such as satellite RDT&E, are less affected than the later 
occurring revenues in an exponential relationship to the discount factor owing to 
their relative proximity in time to the discounting reference point. This difference 
between the upfront costs and later revenues in terms of discounted values is 
shown in Figure 3.7. The "gap" which exists between the discounted sunk costs of 
the program and the discounted revenues constitutes the allowable discoLnted 
investment costs for the program. Clearly, the revenues are far more sensitive to 
the discount rate, occurring as they do much farther in the future. Consequently, 
the "gap" representing allowable costs narrows as the discount rate employed in 
evaluation increases. 
To demonstrate the effect of different discount rates on the value of actual 
proposed programs, the Rockwell program which is analyzed in Section 2 was 
evaluated at a range of discount rates and the results are presented in Figure 3.8. 
As in Section 2, two cases have been analyzed: one using the original Rockwell 
TFU cost data, and a second using TFU cost data with the values for solar cell 
specific cost and mass modified to reflect a more uncertain state-of-knowledge on 
(, .N 
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these parameters, based upon information developed by Arthur D. Little, Inc.* The 
substantial effect on program value, which was noted in Section 2, resulting from 
the increase in risk on these two parameters indicates a necessity for better solar 
cell data as a prelude to economic justification for the program if the program is 
to be evaluated at higher discount rates. Indeed the economic value of the 
program becomes clearly negative at inappropriately high discount rates. Whereas 
4 percent is the discount rate which is recommended for SPS systems definition 
studies, this rate corresponds to a risk-free interest rate, and it is crucial that a 
proper assessment of risk be conducted, in order for the results being evaluated at 
a 4 percent discount rate to represent a valid assessment of the economic value of 
the program under consideration. This has been done here and, with the data 
supplied by the Rockwell and Boeing studies, evaluated at a 4 percent discount 
rate, an SPS program appears economically justified (note that noneconomic 
considerations are not taken into account here--these could either increase or 
decrease the desirability of an SPS program). 
A second effect which the discount rate has on the value of a program is that 
it shifts the "prior distribution" of unit cost on which the decision analytic 
evaluation of the program is based. This occurs because the iscost of each unit 
incurred over some period of time prior to the initial operation date ClOD) of the 
system, and a cost of capital or interest rate is applied to these incurred costs so 
that the cost of an SPS unit which must be recovered during the operation of the 
unit includes the capital cost itself as well as interest charges on it. For the 
purposes of this study, the cost profile for each unit has been characterized as a 
"Space-Based Solar Power Conversion and Delivery Systems Study--Vol. IV, 
Energy Conversion Systems Studies," prepared by A. D.Little, Inc. for ECON,
Inc., under Contract No. NAS8-31308, March 29, 1977. 
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beta distribution beginnihg four years before the IOD and peaking six months 
before the IOD. The difference between applying a 4 percent as opposed to a 7-1/2 
percent interest rate to this cost profile is an almost 4 percent reduction in cost of 
the unit referenced to its IOD date. By thus reducing the cost of the unit the 
chances of its being economically competitive are increased. This is reflected.in 
higher probabilities of success in the decision tree representing the program. With 
higher probabilities of success occurring at each branch of the tree, the revenues 
which obtain at the final branch of the tree are more heavily weighted, that is, a 
larger percentage of the positive returns of the program are included in the 
calculation of the net expected value of the program. 
A final note which should be made on the issue of the proper discount rate to 
be used for comparison of SPS system tradeoffs is that the use of high discount 
rates in energy policy is particularly inconsistent with the emphasis placed on 
conservation of existing, conventional energy resources. Pursuit of policies which 
result in increases in the discount rate beyond that already present in the economy 
would also result in increased consumption rates of the available, nonrenewable 
resources. The emphasis in federal policy on energy conservation above and beyond 
that amount which would already be realized by the market economy implies a 
special role to energy commodities (for national security or macroeconomic 
reasons, perhaps) in the form of a lower discount rate. If this is indeed warranted, 
it should be applied to evaluation of SPS alternatives as well. 
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4. 	 A METHODOLOGY FOR SPS COSTING TO 
DEAL WITH "DIFFERENTIAL INFLATION" 
The development of a cost estimate for any system that has yet to be built 
represents a prediction of the future. As such, it is fraught with a number of 
potential perils. Costs of any technological system are a function of both the 
prices and the quantities of the inputs (labor, resources, capital) involved. The 
"quantity" part of the cost estimate involves a quantification of the required inputs 
-for different levels of system performance, based upon expectations of technology 
advancement. The uncertainties inherent in such estimates are greatly amplified if 
the system is to be built 20 to 30 years in the future and if it is to be based on 
technologies not yet developed. Even if precise knowledge of the quantities of the 
inputs were possible, however, system costs could still be quite difficult to predict 
accurately due to uncertainties in the prices of the inputs. Examples of this 
problem can be observed in the aircraft industry. Boeing has recently produced the 
1500th Boeing 727 aircraft. Suppose, with the productioniof this aircraft, the line 
were shut down and dismantled. Then, suppose 30 years from now, Boeing reopened 
the line and began producing precisely the same aircraft again. Certainly there is 
very little technical uncertainty in the design or production of this aircraft. Yet, 
it is unlikely that the cost of the 727 produced in the year 2008 could be estimated 
today with an error that could be confidently expected to be less than +50 percent, 
even setting aside the effects of inflation (that is, even expressing the cost in 1978 
dollars). This uncertainty is a result of the fact that the national economy with its 
diverse markets and sectors will have continued to operate in the intervening 30 
years with the result of continuously adjusting prices for (and quantities produced 
of) the inputs which would be used to produce a 727 in 2008. Driving this continual 
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process of market adjustments are factors such as' technological innovation, 
changing incomes and preferences, changing real prices (for instance, as a result of 
increasing scarcity) of related goods and substitution, as well as interaction in 
international trade. 
Sometimes the capability of a system changes so that it becomes quite 
difficult to historically compare such costs over a moderate period of time, but an 
illustrative attempt is nonetheless in order. Consider the case of the Beechcraft 
Bonanza. The model 35 Bonanza was introduced in 1947 with a price tag of $7900. 
The base sticker price of the V35B model Bonanza in 1977, 30 years later, was 
$65,950. Inflation over this period accounts for a factor of 2.84 of this increase, 
bringing the 1947 price up to $22,463 in 1977 dollars. (More will be said about 
inflation below.) Of the remaining gap, about 50 percent might be allowed for 
increased capability: higher speed, higher payload, engine improvements, etc. 
Although the 50 percent is quite subjective, it is also probably a generous allotment 
for such improvements. This 50 percent increment brings the price up to $33,695. 
There is a remaining factor of 1.96, or an annual real price increase of 2.26 
percent, yet to be explained. If one had estimated the cost of producing the 1977 
V35B in 1947, it is unlikely that this factor would have been included and, thus, it is 
likely that the cost estimate would have been in error by a factor of at least two, 
even given excellent knowledge of the technical aspects of the system. 
It is clear from the above example that there are a number of economic 
factors which must be taken into consideration when estimating costs of projects in 
the 'mid- to long-term (greater than 20 years in the future). These effects derive 
from market interactions which may be expected to occur in the intervening 
period. In the case of near-term cost estimation, such market phenomena are 
frequently ignored as not having a significant impact on design-cost tradeoffs. 
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However, over the time period during which the SPS will be developed, market 
interactions may have a very substantial effect on the relative prices of inputs for 
SPS production and therefore must be considered explicitly in design-cost analyses. 
Two types of market-induced effects will be discussed below: first, general 
inflation which affects the "money price" (but not the real price) of goods and 
services; and second, relative price changes (sometimes called diferential 
inflation) which represent changes in the real prices of goods and services. 
Relative price changes will be discussed in terms of the three types of economic 
inputs (resources, capital and labor) with recommendations being made in each area 
as to how to approach projections of these changes and the likely limits on the 
accuracy of such forecasts. 
4.1 General Inflation and the Desirability of "Constant Dollar" Analysis 
The value of a dollar at any point in time (that is, the relationship between 
the dollar and real goods and services) is arbitrary. Furthermore, it is constantly 
changing to reflect the complex interactions among different markets and sectors 
within an economy and the interactions among national economies in international 
trade. The dollar is simply a convenient medium of exchange in these processes of 
economic interaction, and its value .(whether measured in relation to other 
currencies or real goods) continuously changes to equilibrate imbalances which 
exist in different types of economic activity (savings, investment, -government 
spending, consumption), imbalances which exist in the demand for and supply of 
goods and services in the various sectors of the economy, as well as imbalances in 
the amount of goods traded between different national economies. 
Inflation is the name given to an adjustment in the value of a unit of currency 
such that the ratio of real goods to the unit of currency decreases. Conversely, the 
(less familiar) process of deflati6n is one in which the ratio of real goods to a unit 
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of currency increases. If one does not bear -in mind, the fact that the dollar is an 
arbitrary unit of measure whose value changes continuously, then in periods of 
continuing high inflation one -might mistakenly conclude that inflation is actually 
an important "cost-driver." In reality, measuring the cost of something at two 
different points in time without correcting for the changing value of the dollar is 
equivalent to measuring the'length of something in meters one time and-feet the 
next time and concluding that the length has changed because the numbers are 
different. 
Correcting for inflation can lead to surprising results. For example, over the 
period 1950 to 1974, the real price (corrected for inflation) of new cars decreased 
by 35 percent, the real price of dairy products decreased by 4 percent, and the real 
price of fuel and utilities decreased by 16 percent (even after the large jump in 
prices in the 1973-1974 period). One of the most surprising areas is the cost of 
borrowing money. While the interest rate5 increase together with the inflation 
rate, there is often a lag in this increase. Thus, the real cost of capital is usually 
lower during periods of high and increasing inflation than it is during periods of 
relatively low inflation, despite the illusion that is created by the numerical rates. 
Several different theories of the cause of inflation have been develoed to 
account for the continued upward march of price indices in different economic 
circumstances. One explanation applied to an economy at full production describes 
what is called "demand-pull" inflation, in which total aggregate demand in the 
economy is greater than the output that can be produced even at full employment. 
The 1930s are a prime example in U.S. economic history of a period of 
deflation. 
This issue of "money illusion" is discussed in Section 3, where the rates of 
return for corporations have been adjusted for inflation, resulting, in some 
cases, in negative rates of return. 
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This excess demand drives up prices, but since no more goods can be produced' 
because the economy is at full capacity, all that changes are the prices--in an 
inflationary spiral. An alternative description has been applied to the recent 
situation of high inflation even though there has been simultaneous high unemploy­
ment, that is, the economy is not at full capacity. This type of inflation has been 
called "cost-push" or sellers' inflation whereby the sellers' of all of the inputs to 
production demand remuneration greater than the total product generated. An 
example of this would be a labor union demanding a wage increase greater than the 
value of whatever increases in productivity had been achieved that year. The 
result of a settlement along such lines can only be an increase in prices, if the 
industry is going to continue to exist. 
The phenomenon of inflation is further complicated by the action of 
government to achieve certain socially desirable ends, such as low unemployment, 
by direct attempts to control or modify economic behavior through regulation,,tax 
incentives, government spending, interest rate and money supply control, among 
others. Thus, if one were to try to predict the rate of inflation over time, he would 
be faced not only with modeling the myriad actors and decisions of the market­
place, but also with trying to model or predict the actions of government as it 
interacts with the economy when the actions of government are essentially 
arbitrary in nature and timing. Consequently, it has proven to be extremely 
difficult to predict with any accuracy the course of inflation in the short run; 
mid-term predictions of inflation have been notoriously inaccurate; and it is 
pointless to try to predict how the value of the dollar will vary over the potential 
time period of SPS development and implementation. 
In addition, the actions of other governments and economies would have to be 
accounted for because of the considerable effect they can have on the value 
of the U.S. dollar as demonstrated so vividly over the past several years. 
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More important than the intractability of forecasting inflation is the fact 
that, even if it were possible to make such a prediction with perfect accuracy, it 
would provide no useful information for the purposes of SPS program decision 
making. To estimate costs either at the present or for the future one need only be 
concerned with real costs (that is, measured against real goods) referenced to a 
specific point in time. A cost estimate is referenced to a specific point in time by 
specifying at what point in time the value of. the dollar is taken to be fixed.. For 
instance, all of the cost estimates in this report are expressed in "mid-1977" 
dollars, which says that the relationship which existed between real goods and 
dollars in mid-1977 is the one to be used for the purposes of cost estimation in this 
study. If one wishes to incorporate together or compare estimates made in 
different year dollars, it is necessary to adjust all of .the estimates to a single 
reference point in time, making use of relationships between the dollar and real 
goods, that is, convert all of the estimates to one particular year's dollars, so that 
like elements are being combined or compared. 
A number of price indices exist to aid in making intertemporal comparisons 
of the value of the dollar. Three of the most familiar are shown in Figure 4.1. The 
most generally used tool for adjustment of the changing value of the dollar is the 
GNP (gross national product) implicit price deflator which is an all-encompassing 
indicator that measures the "overall" value of the dollar against a "standard" 
dollar, such-as 1972. To convert (in this case inflate) a cost estimate made in 1960 
dollars to 1975 dollars, one would multiply the earlier estimate by the ratio of the 
index of the later year (123.5) to the index of the earlier year (68.5). Thus, an 
estimate of a cost of 100 dollars in 1960 is equivalent to an estimate of 
approximately 180 1975 dollars. The other two familiar price indices shown in 
Figure 4.1 are the consumer price index and the wholesale price index. The former 
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tracks the total price of a standard market basket of consumer goods and the latter 
tracks the total price of a standard market basket of wholesale items. As these 
latter two indices are tied to specific sets of products, the GNP price deflator is 
generally regarded as a more desirable index for genera adjustments in the value 
of the dollar. In any event, it can be seen from Figure 4.1 that the three indices 
remain closely related over time. 
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If the GNP index is to be used to define the value of the dollar, then the use 
of the GNP implicit price deflator is also appropriate for adjusting historical costs 
in order to obtain data for cost estimates of future projects. The effects of 
inflation must always be removed from historical costs before these costs are to be 
used for forecasting future costs; Also, long-term cost trends, such as an 
increasing cost of labor, must be properly taken into account. Proper adjustments 
for the cost of capital are also necessary and can be quite difficult to make 
properly. All of these factors make it quite difficult to use historical costs as a 
basis for estimates of future costs over substantial time periods. The cost 
estimator must take extreme caution not to fall into any of several potential 
"accounting traps." 
The techniques described above are appropriate for adjusting historical cost 
estimates to a single reference point. That reference point for the value of the 
dollar is then used in forecasts of relative price changes, as described below, and it 
is this single reference point for the value of the dollar used both for aggregating 
historical cost estimates and for making estimates of future costs which is 
indicated by the term "constant dollar" analysis. Before proceeding with a 
discussion of techniques for the forecasting of future relative price changes, 
however, a few more comments on the relative desirability of constant dollar 
analysis and the appropriate role of inflation in economic analysis are needed. The 
desire to include an inflation effect in future cost estimation may be motivated by 
some sense of "realism," that is, inflation is a real effect and, therefore, if it is not 
included in an analysis, it is perhaps thought that something is missing. Indeed, 
inflation is of concern to macrolevel decision makers because high levels of 
inflation can be destabilizing to an economic system and because inflation acts to 
degrade the capital base of the country if it is not properly taken into account, as 
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discussed in Section 3.1. And clearly, inflation is of concern to individuals, 
particularly individuals on fixed incomes, for if their wages do not keep pace with 
price increases, then their real purchasing power decreases over time. However, 
for those interested in cost estimation, inflation does not matter, for costs exist in 
terms of real goods, and the actual number of dollars corresponding to an amount 
of real goods at any point in time is unimportant and does not affect any decisions 
which might, for instance, be made on the ordering of the costs of alternative 
approaches.
 
In addition, there are several advantages to constant dollar analysis over 
attempts to include the effect of inflation. First, since it is impossible to predict 
accurately the course of inflation over the time period of SPS development and 
implementation for reasons described above, one is forced to assume a rate of 
inflation. Consequently, all of the results from an analysis including an assumed 
rate of inflation are dependent, at least in magnitude, upon what value was 
assumed for inflation and therefore may not be compared with any other results 
unless the same technique and values were used with respect to inflation. By 
contrast, constant dollar analysis is equivalent to assuming an inflation rate of 
zero, a simplification which is possible without sacrificing any useful information. 
For example, the results of that analysis can readily be updated and correctly 
compared to later year data by bringing them "forward" at an objective, historical 
inflationary rate as it occurred. Analyses that are an amalgam of assumed or 
predicted rates, etc. are close to impossible to disentangle in later years for 
purposes of updating or checking. Second, by dealing with a constant dollar value 
corresponding, for example, to 1977 dollars, one is working with units for which one 
has some intuitive sense of value and with which he or she can measure the 
reasonableness of cost estimates within his or her area of expertise. Who could 
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have any sense of what a 	dollar will be worth in 2005--again, measured in real 
percent rate of inflation? The applicationgoods--assuming a 4, 5 or 6 of 
subjective judgment is crucial in future cost estimation, a process which is difficult 
enough without introducing the artificial and unnecessary complication of assumed 
rates of inflation which add nothing to the analysis. 
4.2 	 Projecting Relative Price Changes 
terms, three types of inputs are required to produce aIn general economic 
a cost tree depicting, bygood: resources, capital and labor. Figure 4.2 shows 
economic category, these cost components. The resources branch of this tree may 
be further divided into resources which are practically infinite and resources which 
can be further subdivided into are discernably finite. Practically infinite resources 
resources for which there is a constant cost of recovery and those for which, due to 
depletion of easily recovered reserves, the cost of recovery is increasing with time 
or, due to improved technology or economies of scale, is decreasing with time. The 
cost of capital is discussed 	extensively in Section 3 of this report. Suffice it to say 
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here that there exists a certain volatility in the cost of capital which affects the 
precise cost of capital at any given point in time. This is simply another 
component of uncertainty in the total cost of an SPS system. The remaining cost 
components are treated individually below. 
4.2.1 Labor 
As a direct result of technology innovation, the productivity of labor has 
increased steadily throughout this century. The productivity of labor over the past 
23 years is detailed in Figure 4.3. Over this period, there has been an average 
annual increase of 3.8 percent. The result of increasing productivity is that, each 
successive year, there is an increasing per capita supply of goods available for 
distribution. Hence, there is increasing real income, acrossan on the average, all 
employees. The magnitude of this- increase is illustrated in Figure 4.4. Over the 
past 23 years there has been an average annual increase of 3.2 percent in real 
compensation for all nonfarm business employees. (The slightly lower rate of 
increase in real income compared to productivity is due in part to the fact that a 
decreasing fraction of the total work force is productive. This occurs, for 
example, as more and more people become employed in the regulation of industry.) 
In the "average" industry, the increased real cost of labor is precisely offset 
by the increase in productivity so that the real cost of labor to produce the 
"average" good remains constant in time and hence the real cost of the "average" 
good remains constant. The "average" employee improves his standard of living 
because he obtains an increasing real income with time. Averages, however, do not 
apply in specific cases. For example, the productivity of labor in producing hand­
held calculators is increasing very rapidly, resulting even in a declining price for 
the resulting good. On the other hand, the construction industry shows a very low 
rate of technology innovation with commensurately increasing construction costs. 
130 
120 
110 
100 
90 
i0 
AVERAGE 3.8%/YR +10 
+5 , 
-5 
1955 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79-
YEAR 
FIGURE 4.3 PRODUCTIVITY, ALL EMPLOYEES, NONFARM BUSINESS SECTOR 
(cZ4 
V)
cc 
220 
200 
180 
8D 160 
- 140 
120 
100 
130 
.120 
110 
100 
-90 
c 
"C-J 
w.un 
80 
, 
+10 
+5AVERAGE = 3.2%/YR 
='0 
< 
0 
-5 
1955 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77' 
FIGURE 4.4 
YEAR 
COMPENSATION, ALL EMPLOYEES, NONFARM BUSINESS SECTOR 
80 
The fact that prices vary, as in the above examples, rather than wage rates is due 
to the fact -that long-term effects of technology innovation in one industry versus 
no innovation in another would -result in widely disparate wage rates if the adjust­
ments went totally into labor rate changes. This effect would cause an abundance 
of labor in areas where technology innovation is high and a shortage of labor where 
innovation is low. The resulting labor supply would then force wage rates to 
equalize across the industries with resulting impacts on prices. Returning to the 
example of the Beechcraft Bonanza, the technology for producing the airplane has 
changed very little over the past 30 years. Thus, at a 3.2 percent per year real 
wage increase, the real labor cost to produce the airplane has increased by a factor 
of about 2.57 during this period. Since much of the cost of producing the airplane 
is in labor, this largely explains the remaining factor of 1.96 between 1947 and 1977 
production costs. 
The implication of the above notions on SPS costing are as follows: 
1. 	 The real wage rate can be expected to increase at about 2 to 3 
percent per year. Thus, the real cost of labor to build an SPS in 
the year 2000 will be about twice the cost of the same labor in 
1978. Of course such increases also apply for costing other energy 
alternatives. 
2. 	 The productivity of labor for building an SP5 cannot be expected 
to increase since expected increases have already been accounted 
for in estimating the manpower requirements. 
3. 	 There is no guarantee that the wage rate will continue to increase 
at 3.2 percent per year just because it has historically done so. 
Thus, one should acknowledge that there exists a rather substan­
tial uncertainty in the real cost of labor 20 years or more into the 
future.
 
4.2.2 Resources 
Resources comprise the basic building (or raw) materials for an SPS. They 
may include materials such as aluminum, copper, silicon, gallium, graphite, and so 
on. These materials are converted into SPS components such as solar cells, 
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structural members, etc., by the use of capital and labor. When component 
production rates are low, the capital and labor costs for producing components are 
generally much larger than the resource costs. But when production rates are high, 
the component costs can approach the sum of the resource and energy costs which 
the components require. (in fact, the energy cost may also be reduced by 
technology innovation.) To be sure, much of the resource costs can be tied to 
capital and labor for resource recovery in which case the above principles apply. 
However, it is more convenient here to deal with resources as raw material inputs 
to the SPS construction process. The mining industry is one in which there has 
been a significant level of technology innovation to offset rising real labor costs. 
Not all of the costs associated with resources can be tied to capital and 
labor, at least not in the conventional sense. This fact has recently been made 
quite clear by the behavior of the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries) cartel's behavior relative to the price of crude oil. The present OPEC 
price, some 65 times the marginal cost of recovery, includes an economic "rent" 
which the holders of the resource charge to the users of the resource to 
compensate for the resource's finiteness. There are clearly times when these rents 
become the dominant cost. 
The discussion below deals first with resources that are perceived to be 
infinite and second with resources that are discemably finite. The major 
distinguishing feature that determines whether a resource is perceived to be finite 
or infinite is the way in which the resource is priced. Of course, all resources are 
ultimately finite. However, a particular resource may be widely distributed and 
This was the relationship calculated for the marginal cost of recovery 
(average for all the OPEC countries) and the market price in 1977. 
J1L 
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may have a runout horizon of thousands of years. Under such circumstances, the 
resource is generally priced at a rate which reflects its production cost. If, on the 
other hand, the resource reserves are controlled by a few nations or individuals, or 
if the runout horizon is short, say less than 100 years, then quite often economic 
.rents are charged for depletion of the resource. In the former case, long-term 
price forecasting is best done by examining the historical prices and the current 
and projected production costs. In the latter case, prices may fluctuate over a 
wide range as the result of politics and policies, however, the long-term economic 
forces drive the price toward an "equilibrium" level which maximizes the value of 
the resource to its holders. Such appears to be the case, for example, with respect 
to petroleum. 
4.2.2.1 Practically Infinite Resources 
Table 4.1 shows the reserve and resource situation for a number of minerals. 
While ultimate resources for many minerals may be extremely large, the reserves 
of these resources may be quite finite. Such is the case for iron ore and domestic 
bauxite reserves. The core of the earth may be made of iron and iron may be 
present in vast quantities in the earth's crust, but easily recovered ore, by current 
technology is quite limited. Similarly, the total domestic supply of aluminum is 
virtually unlimited, but not in the form of bauxite. This could become important if 
it became desirable to limit aluminum imports. Thus, looking at the index of 
reserves divided by annual production giyes some indication of the time horizon to 
the point at which significant peturbations in production costs might be expected. 
Where this index is on the order of hundreds to thousands of years, historical cost 
trends probably yield the best information on future price expectations. Where this 
Reserves are defined as those resources which have been identified and 
delineated as viable in the context of the current economic and technological 
conditions. 
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index is on the order of decades to, say, 100 years, significant changes in price 
structure could occur during the SPS program. For these resources, it would be 
prudent to cost production from alternative sources. It could be useful to do this, 
for.example, for aluminum. 
A reasonable approach to costing many resources is to simply examine the 
historical cost trends. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show 28-year trends for aluminum and 
copper. To use long-term data, one must first convert all prices to a common unit, 
say 1972 dollars. This can be done using deflator index such as the GNPa price 
deflator given in Figure 4.2. The deflated prices can then be analyzed statistically. 
Unless there is a clear upward (or downward) trend in the price, it is generally 
6dequate to simply use the long-term average price as the "best guess" of the 
future price (beyond the next few years). 
Beyond estimating the long-term average price, it is useful to examine the 
volatility of the price over time. For example, the standard deviation of the price 
about the long-term average is an interesting parameter. It provides an estimate 
of potential variability of the price at any future time and thus measures inability 
to predict future prices. Because long-term (secular) price trends are difficult to 
predict in advance, and because they may be present today, it is probably wise to 
consider the three-standard- deviation .range' as the bound on one's ability to 
forecast future resource prices. As the price volatilities for aluminum and copper 
indicate, the three-standard-deviation band can be on the order of the resource's 
long-term average price. Thus, it is very plausible that many resources will not be 
priceable to better than a factor of plus minus twoor over the time period when 
such resources would be needed for SPS. However, it should be emphasized that 
this is strictly a plus or minus situtation, not one that is biased one way or the 
other. 
86 
36 
PRIOR TO 1972 PRICES ARE
 
48 FOR 99t UNALLOYED INGOT 	 CURRENT
 
PRICE
 
44'
 
~40 
 te 
SI RTANDAR
DEVIATION
 
RTIT RANGE
 
, AVERAGE 1. CENT/OND
ES/POUNDEFLATED PRICE 
32 ," 33.65 CENTS/POUND N. , ",,,.. /* PRICEDEFLATED
 
S28
 
2. 24 
La20
 
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
 
YEAR
 
FIGURE 4.5 	 PRICE OF ALUMINUM--VIRGIN 99.5% UNALLOYED
 
INGOT--JANUARY
 
65 
CURRENT PRICE 
iit
60 fit 
1­
50 IAVERAIIE DEFLATED PRICE * 50 	
.47.62 CENTS/POUND 
I ~DEFLATED PRICE 
45 1 	 I STANDARD DEVIATION11t, 	 UNCERTAINTY RANGEV ____ 13.8 CENTS/POUND 
= 40 _ 
35
 
30
 
25
 
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
 
YEAR
 
FIGURE 4.6 	 PRICE OF WIREBAR COPPER--N.Y. REFINERY EQUIVALENT--JANUARY
 
87 
Another problem in resource pricing that shows up in the data of Figures 4.5 
and 4.6 is that the prices of many minerals are correlated in time. Thus, if the 
price of one mineral goes up, it is likely that others will also. This means that cost 
uncertainties are not necessarily reduced by using a variety of materials in the 
system design. 
Finally, it is again worth emphasizing that this state of price forecasting 
applies to all future energy systems, not just SPS. It is not a good nor a bad 
feature of SPS that such prices cannot be predicted accurately, it is just a fact of 
life that must be accepted and dealt with accordingly. 
4.2.2.2 .Discernably Finite Resources 
To round out this discussion, it is necessary to discuss the pricing of 
discernably finite resources. To be sure, one should recognize that resources are, 
in general, quite vast and widespread. However, there is an energy cost associated 
with their recovery that is difficult to escape. The same is true of energy 
resources and, hence, one might say that they are limited to the extent that, at 
some point, the energy cost for recovering these resources will equal the energy 
contained in the resources recovered. In this context, fossil and nuclear fuels are, 
indeed, limited. From this it follows that other resources are limited, but only by 
the economics, and particularly the energy costs, of their recovery. Thus, the 
discussion which follows applies fully to energy resources, and to other resources 
within the context that, at some price, the resource supply becomes very large. At 
such high prices, monopolies and cartels give way to competition -from other 
sources. 
The basic notion employed in the development of a mathematical model for 
medium- to long-range pricing of finite resources is that the holders of these 
resources wish maximize value their to Thisto the of resource themselves. 
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assumption leads to an economically optimal price as a function of time. Short­
term variations may -occur around the economically optimal price due to political 
factors and due to uncertainty in economic parameters such as the demand 
elasticity and the resource reserves. However, considerable pressure is exerted by 
the economic forces tending to drive the price towards its "equilibrium" value. 
Thus, in the long run, we believe that the economically optimal price is the "best 
guess" of future resource price. Certainly, this seems to be the case with 
unregulated oil prices at the present time. 
The mathematical model is formulated as follows: It is desired to maximize 
3, where 
3 " e-p t u(Q,q,t)dt (4-1)
 
where t is time, pis the resource holder's discount rate, Q is the magnitude of the 
reserve at time, t, and q is the rate .of downdrawal of 'the reserve. The 
maximization is subject to the constraints: 
dQT= _q
-t 

q>0
 
for all t)Q>0 
and it is assumed that Q(t=O) = Q0 (today's reserve) is known. This problem is read: 
select the functional q(t) which maximizes the present value of present and future 
utilities (that is, worth), U(Q,q,t), to the resource holders from resource production 
subject to the constraints that total resource inventory diminishes at the rate at 
which the resource is produced for consumption and that the resource is nonrenew­
able. 
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It is appropriate to consider that the utility of resource production may be 
given as the net revenues generated by the resource, that is, the gross revenues 
For example, let S(Q,q,t) be the per unit cost of extractionminus extraction costs. 
at price P. Assumingof the resource and D(P,t) be the demand for the resource 
that prbduction equals demand, 
q = D(P,t) 
yields price as a function of production and time, 
P = P(qt) 
Then, the utility of production can be written 
U(Q,q,t) = q[P(q,t) - S(Q,q,t)] 
This is an optimal control problem where the control variable is q and the state 
on the form of P(q,t) andvariable is Q. The solution to this problem depends 
S(Q,q,t). A typical solution is given in Appendix A of ECON Report No. 77-146-1, 
"A Study of Some Economic Factors Relating to the Development and Implemen­
tation of a Satellite Power System." For convenience, this solution is repeated in 
canthis report in Appendix A. The solution yields q as a function of time which 
then be translated into price as a function of time. Substantial variability might be 
expected around the optimal price at any point in time. In the long term, such 
variability cannot be forecast. 
4.3 	 Caveats 
The methods for forecasting future costs presented above assume a "business 
as 	normal" environment. Any number of events could occur to create large cost 
major changes in thevariations. These include mainly factors which could cause 

supply or demand picture for resources or labor- a major economic recession,
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war, drastically new technologiesi political changes, etc. The major thing one 
should be aware of is the new demand for resources which SPS will create. If this 
demand is a significant fraction of the total resource demand, large changes in 
resource cost can be expected. These are likely, but not necessarily, to be upward. 
War should not be discounted. The possibility of war in the South African 
nations which hold much of the world's mineral resources is very real. 
Resulting changes in political structures (or even the threat of change) can 
result in drastically changed resource price structures. Such was recently the 
case with cobalt in Zaire. 
cs=&:U 
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APPENDIX A 
A NONRENEWABLE RESOURCE PRICE MODEL 
This appendix develops a solution to the nonrenewable price model described 
in Section 4. Consider the problem of selecting a functional q(t) so as to maximize 
a, 
T 
J J U [q(t), Q(t), t] e - Pt dt, 
0 
subject to the constraints: 
(t) = -q(t)
 
q(t), Q(t) > 0.
 
Specify a priori the following conditions on U: 
Uq, UQ > 0 
Uqq<O , 
and that Q(t 0 ) = Q. These conditions, in particular that on Uq, guarantee that 
i) the control inequality constraint q > 0 will never be active, and 
(ii) 	 there exists some time, T, T <=o, where Q = 0 and the state inequality 
constraint Q > 0 becomes active. 
Although the problem is properly considered as an infinite horizon one, the 
nonrenewability of the resource Q and condition (ii) above make it such that the 
control problem ends at time T; there exist no more options. 
dxF
 
The following notations are used: x = T- and for F(xy)y E== - .x By x(t) is 
ax
meant the optimal time path of x. 
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From Takayama (Theorem S.A.3, p. 613), the necessary conditions for the 
optimality of the functional q(t) are: 
(i)T' 
where H = H [q(t), Q(t), t, s(t), v(t)] 
- P t 
= v(t)u[^(t), Qt), tie - s(t) (t); 
s~t), v~t)] > H [q~t), Q(t), t,-s(t), VWt] , for([i) H [q~t), Q^(t), t, 
all admissable q(t); 
(iii) H[q(T), Q(T), T, s(T), v(T)] = 0; 
(v) v(t) = constani > 0. 
s(t) and v(t) are 	Lagrangian multipliers or adjoint variables. 
Condition (ii),requires
 
-

-Pt - s(t)q(t) > vU[q(t), Q(t),t]Pet - s(t)q(t),vu[Lq(t), Q(t), te
 
given the constant v as specified in condition (iv). Now if v = 0, then
 
s(t)q(t) <s(t)q(t), 
Since v and s(t) cannot vanish simultaneously ("Fritz John's theorem"; see 
If s(t) < 0, this 	implies q(t) > q(t) for all q(t) > 0, andTakayama, p. 612), s(t) A0. 
But an infinite rate of downdrawal is clearlythus q(t) would 	be unbounded above. 
If s(t)> 0, and letting q(t) = 0, the implication is that q(t) z 0 for all not optimal.** 
t, which is clearly not optimal given the condition Uq> 0. Thus, v A0. Without loss 
= o up to
of generality we can set v = 1. Condition (ii) also yields the condition 
time T since q(t) will be in the interior of the admissable region. 
Takayarna, A., Mathematical Economics, The Dryden Press, 1974. 
*That an infinite rate of downdrawal were optimal would imply that buyers occur
could absorb Q in an infinitessimal amount of time; and this would 
more elastic than -1.without letting Semand become 
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From the above conditions, the following equations are obtained: 
5=-U e- Pt (A- I) 
5 = -q(t) (A-2) 
-s(t) = U qe p t  (A-3) 
s(T)q(T) = U[&(T), ^(T), T]e I pT* (A-4) 
Equations A-I to A-3 describe the movement of the system up until the entry into 
the constraint, i.e., 0 < t < T-. Equation (A-4) describes the transversality 
condition at T +. (A-1) to (A-4) is a system of two first-order differential 
equations, (A-I) and (A-2), with two boundary conditions known: Q(T o ) = Qo and 
Q(T) = 0. The system also contains the unknown T and two independent equations, 
(A-3) and (A-4). Henceforth, it will be understood that q(t) and Q(t) refer to the 
optimal time paths. 
The effect of the state variable inequality constraint, Q(t) > 0, has not yet 
been considered. Doing so yields an additional necessary condition for optimality, 
called the jump condition. This provides an expression for 9(T). According to 
Pontryagin et al., at the time that the optimal path enters into the constraint 
boundary [here, time T where Q(t) = 0] , the following condition holds: 
v+(T) = v-(T) 
s+(T) = s-(T) -(A-5) 
(A-5) permits equating s+(T) from (4) with s-(T) from (A-3). Before proceeding 
further, the form of U[q(t),q(t),tJ must be specified. The analysis up to this point 
is quite general in nature. A special case is dealt with below. 
L. S. Pontryagin, V. G. Boltyanskii, R. V. Gramkrelidze, and E. F. Mishchenko, 
The Mathematical Theory of Optimal Processes, New York, Wiley Interscience, 
1962 (tr. by K. N. Trirogoff from Russian original), p. 302. 
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An Exponentially Increasing Demand Case 
Consider a linear demand function in which the quantity demanded as a 
function of price grows exponentially. Such a function has the following form: 
p(t)
q(t) =L-- -a,] e ' Yt 
Solving for p(t) yields 
p(t) = "Yt q(t) (A-6)aI + a 2 e 
Take the cost of recovery to be given by the expressionb2 2 
c(t) =blq(t) + - q(t)2 +b2 [Qo - Q(t)Jq(t) (A-7) 
Now we define the (undiscounted) rate of utility increase as net revenue: 
U [Cq(t), Q(t)3 = q(t) - p(t) - c(t) 
U(a, - bi - b2Q0 )q(t) + (a 2e'Yt - -2)q(t)2 + b2 Q(t)q(t) 
or, simplifying coefficients, 
Ucq(t), Q(t) =Clq(t) + h(t)q(t)2 + C3 Q(t)q(t) (A-8) 
From this the following obtains 
Uq =C 1 + 2h(t)q(t) + C 3Q(t) (A-9) 
(A-10)UQ C3q(t). 
Substitute (A-9) into (A-3) 
(A-l)s(t) = CcI + 2h(t)q(t) + C3 Q(t)3 e-Pt 

and solve for q(t)
 
q(t) =7 [s(t)e Pt- C C 3Q(tB (A-12) 
Consider now equation (A-4). which describes the transversality conditions. Sub­
stituting (A-8) 
Although dt is specified that h(t) = a2e-yt - b t 
-
on the form of h(t) in what follows. 
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s+(T)q(T) = -q(T) CCI + h(T)q(T) + C3 Q(T)] e - T.
 
Now, if q(T) A 0, divide through by q(T), noting that, by'definition Q(T) = 0:
 
s+()= -C e-PT _ h(t)e-P T q(T).
 
Substitute (A- 11) 
s+(T) = -C 1 e-PT 1/2 s(T) + 1/2 Cje-PT 
Noting that s+(T) = s-(T) (the jump condition), 
s-(T) = CIe-PT. 
If, on the other hand, q(T) = 0, solve (A-11) directly for s-(T), finding 
s-(T) = C1 e-PT. (A- 13) 
Thus obtains the final necessary condition for optimality. 
One can now proceed to solve the system of differential equations. Recalling 
Q= -q, differentiate (A-11) to obtain 
- p
= -p e CCI1 - 2h(t) + C 3Q(tb 
-+ e p t C-2h' (t)Q - 2h(t)Q + C3Q] (A-I1) 
Substitute (A-10) into (A-I) 
= -C 3q(t)e- # t 
- C e-Pt (A- 15) 
Equate (A-I1) and (A-15) 
-pC + 2p ht)Q - p C3Q(t) - 2h'(t)Q - 2h(t)Q + C3Q = C3Q 
Thus, 
-2h(t)Q + 2 f h(t) - h'(tj - p C3 Q(t) = CI (A-16) 
or 
=[" - 7 Q + M717(T 2t(T (A- 17)
*1t)PC 3 PC1 
Thus, a second-order ordinary differential equation in Q(t) is obtained. The 
boundary conditions Q(0) = QO and Q(T) = 0 are known. Additionally, from (A-13) 
and (A-il), q(T) = 0. T, however, is not known. Equation A-l7 can be solved either 
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by choosing some initial consumption rate q(0) and solving until Q(T) = 0 or by a 
Frobenius series solution of the form 
C
 1 Wq(t) 0Ak (Fl't)k 
Unfortunately, the series solution requires the use of about 100 terms to obtain 
adequate accuracy and thus holds no computational advantage over the numerical 
solution. The numerical computations of the first procedure are minimized by 
noting that any two solutions to a linear DE (such as A-17) can be linearly 
combined to form a third solution. Thus iteration on q(O) is not necessary; one 
simply combines two arbitrary solutions in the manner which yields q(T) = 0 where 
Q(T) = 0 and uses this same linear combination to find the optimal q(0). 
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APPENDIX B
 
THEORETICAL FIRST UNIT (TFU)AND OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE (O&M) 
COST MODELS FOR THE ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL SPS CONFIGURATION 
The following is a listing of the equations incorporated in the TFU and O&M 
cost models of the Rockwell International SPS configuration as described in 
"Satellite Power Systenis (SPS) Concept Definition Study" of April 1978. The 
equations are organized here to correspond to the structure delineated in "Satellite 
Power System Work Breakdown Structure Dictionary," NASA TM 78155, January 
1978. Where discrepancies exist in the level of detail developed or the elements 
identified between the Rockwell report and the suggested WBS structure in the 
NASA document, an attempt has been made to reconcile the differences and to 
report the cost equations at the lowest possible level of detail corresponding to the 
NASA WBS structure. The definitions of the variables used in these equations have 
been gathered together at the end of each cost model in order to avoid repetition. 
It should be noted that the cost model is designed to calculate the cost of a 
single satellite. The data listed in Appendix D correspond to the TFU of the 
Rockwell configuration, and therefore the cost of a single satellite calculated by 
the models listed below is for the cost of the TFU. Where costs or masses below 
relate to facilities or equipment used to construct more than one satellite, these 
costs and masses are amortized in the model so that each satellite pays an equal 
portion of the common cost. For example, in the case of the space bases, whose 
lifetime is equal to the total time required to build the SPS fleet, the cost of the 
space bases has been spread over all the satellites, such that each satellite pays an 
annuity at its IOD, the sum of all of which annuities discounted at the indicated 
discount rate equals the present value of the space base at the IOD of the first 
1-1 /u 
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production unit. 1'ence, any variable which corresponds the total procurement cost 
of equipment which is used for the construction of more than one satellite is the 
amount of the cost of such equipment which has been amortized to each satellite. 
A similar amortization process has also been applied to the masses of space-based 
equipment (used for the construction of more than one satellite) for the purpose of 
calculating total transportation cost associated with the construction of one 
satellite. 
B.I The TFU Cost Model of the Rockwell International Configuration 
01-00-00 Satellite System 
CSAT = CSPM + CSSEI + CST + CPS + CANT + CPDC 
CMISC + CGAI + CSGTH + CSGTO + CGSE + COp S 
MSAT = MST + MPS + MANT + MpDC + MMISC 
01-01-00 Structure 
CST = CAST + CpSST + CMECHS + CSEST 
MST = MAST + MPSST + MMECHS + MSEST 
01-01-01 Antenna Structure 
CAST = SCAST PANT PD 
MAST = SMAST PANT PD 
01-01-02 Power Source Structure 
AB = PSAPD 
ASC F nEFF 1SFSC 'AD fED 
(nEFF - 1) AB 
ACONC 
CpSST = SCPssT (AB + AC ) 
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MPSST = SMPSST (AB + AC) 
01-01-03 Mechanisms
 
CMECHS = SCMECHS (AB + AC)
 
MMECHS = SMMEcHS (AB + AC)
 
01-01-04 Secondary Structure
 
CSEST SCSEST (AB + Ac)
 
M S MSEST (AB + AC)
 
01-02-00 Power Source 
CPs = CSB + CSC + CPDC 
MPs = mSB + MSC + MpDC 
01-02-01 Solar Blankets
 
CSB = SCsB AB
 
MSB = SMsB AB
 
01-02-02 Solar Concentrators 
C sSCsc Ac 
Msc = SMsc Ac 
01-03-00 Power Distribution and Conditioning 
CpDC= (SCcNDC + SCSWT + SCBATT + SCBPc) PSAPD 
+ SCSR PANT INT 
MPDC = (SMcNDC + SMswT + SMBATT + SMBPc) PSAPD 
+ SMSR PANT INT 
01-04-00 Microwave Antenna 
CHP = SCHPp DC-RF 
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MHp = SMHP PDC-RF 
CMWA = SCMWA PDC-RF 
MMWA = SMMWA PDC-RF 
CANT = CHP CMWA 
MANT 
- MHP + MMWA 
01-05-00 Rotary Joint 
[Hardware elements in this category have been included 
elsewhere. ] 
01-06-00 Propulsion 
[Hardware elements in this category have been included in 
Miscellaneous Equipment below.] 
01-07-00 Energy Storage 
[Hardware elements in this category have been included 
elsewhere. ] 
01-08-00 Avionics 
[Hardware elements in this category have been included in 
Miscellaneous Equipment below. ]' 
Miscellaneous Eauipment
 
CMISC = SCMISC (MST + MPS + MANT + MPDC)
 
MMISC = SMMISC (MST + MPS + MANT + MpDC ) 
[NOTE: Miscellaneous equipment in the Rockwell configuration
includes thermal control equipment which is not included in the 
NASA WBS dictionary.] 
01-09-00 Ground Assembly and Integration 
CSUPC = CST + CANT + C + CPDC 
CGAI= fGAI CSUPC 
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01-10-00 System Ground Test Hardware 
CSGTH = fSGTH CSUPC 
01-11-00 System Ground Test Operations 
CSGTO = fSGTO GSUPC 
01-12-00 Ground Support Equipment 
CGSE = fGSE CSUPC 
01-13-00 Satellite System Program Management 
"CsPM=fSPM (CST + CPS + CANT + CMISC + CMISC + CGAI + 
CSGTH + CSGTO + CGSE +'COPS ) 
0l-14-00 Satellite System Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) 
CSSEI f1SSEI (CST + CPS + CANT + CMISC + CGAI + CSGTH + 
CSGTO + CGSE + COp S ) 
02-00-00 Ground Station System 
CGS = CGSPM + CGSSEI + CRECT + CISATCON + CUTINT + CS& F 
02-01-00 Rectanna
 
CRECT = CDIPREC + CRECPDC + C pS 
02-01-01 Dipole/Rectifier Elements
 
CDIPREC = SCDIPREC PRF-DC
 
02-01-02 Rectenna Power Distribution and Conditioning 
CRECPDC = SCRECPD PRECT'PD 
". oug 
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02-01-03 Rectenna Support and Ground Plane Structure 
CGPS = SCGPS PRF-DC 
02-02-00 Satellite Control
 
CSATCON= [Input Value]
 
02-03-00 Utility Interface
 
CUTINT = SCUTINT PRECT PD
 
02-04-00 Site and Facilities
 
CS& F = CLP + CRF + CUT + CB + CME
 
02-05-00 Ground Station Program Management 
CGSPM = fGSPM (CRECT + CSATCON + CUTINT + CS&F) 
02-06-00 Ground Station SE&I
 
CGSSEI = fGSSEI (CRECT + CSATCON + CUTINT + CS&F)
 
03-00-00 Manpower Operations 
CGROP S = CSGO + CGCONST + CGLOGS 
COROPS = CCCREW + CCPROV CCEMS 
Cops = CGROPS + COROPS + CGSOP S 
04-00-00 Orbital Assembly and Support 
CSPAST = CLEOSB + CGEOSB 
MSPAST = MLEOSB + MGEOSB 
04-01-00 Construction Base and
 
04-03-00 O&M Support Base
 
N GEO fSHPD * fNPPS 
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NGEO 
 1C - NGEO RCONST fDIGEO (NADM SCADM + 
NCHM SCcH M + NCLM-SCcLM + NOM SCcoM + 
NCSM SCCSM + NPOWM SCPOWM + NPSM ScPSM 
NSDA SCSDH + NSM SCSM + CFIX ) 
NGEO 1 
GEOSB f NGEO RCONST DLGEO (NADN SMADM + 
NCHM SMcHM + NCLM SMCLM + NOM SMcoM + 
NCSM SMcSM + NPOWM SMPOWM + NPSM SMPSM + 
NSDH SMSDH + NSM SMSM + MFIX) 
04-02-00 Logistics Base 
NLEO, 1 
CLEOSB t fNLEO RCONST t DLLEO SCcsM 
Sc co M + SCPOWM) 
NLEO 1_______+ 
MLEOSB f NLEO RcONST 1 DLLEO (SM + SMCSM 
SCcoM + SMPOWM) 
05-00-00 Assembly and Support Equipment 
NBM SCBM Nc SCc NCAM SCCAMCASE = RCONST fDLBM RCONSTf DLC RCONST 1DLCAM 
NRM SCRM NBD SCBD NRD SC RDRCNT+DP + + 
R CONST fDLPM RCONST fDLBD RCONST fDLRD 
NCD SCcD NAP I SCApL
 
RCONSTIDLCD +RCONST fDLAPI
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M NBM SMBM MC SMC NCAM SMCAM
ASE RCONST fDLBM RCONST IDLC RCONST fDLCAM + 
NRM SMRM NBD SMBD NRD SMRD 
RCONST f[DLRM RCONST 1DLBD RCONST fDLRD + 
NCD SMCD NAP I SMAPI
 
RCONST 1[DLCD RCONST fDLARI
 
06-00-00 Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (HLLV) 
tCHLLV CHLVPR + CHLVOP
 
06-01-00 HLLV Fleet 
MLEO = MST + MPS + MANT + MMISC + MSPAST + MASE + 
MCOTV + M 1OV N f 
GEO RROTN MLE 

LVFLT M +
MLEO CONST 
P/L *LOAD P-LV POTV
 
N ~NLVFLT 
NHLLV = tDLLV 
C HLVPR = SCHLLV NHLLV 
06-02-00 HLLV Operations 
CHLVOP = SCLVFLT NLVFLT 
07-00-00 Space Transportation System (STS)* 
ClO V = CIOVPR + CIOVOP 
This category refers to the Rockwell Intra-Orbit Vehicle (IOV) which 
transfers payloads from HLLVs to the LEO Space Base. 
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07-01-00 STS Fleet 
MLEO = MSAT + MCOTV + MASE + MSPAST 
N 0 fMLEO 
O: MP/L LOAD DLIOV 
CIOVPR : SCIo V NIOV 
MLEO 
MIO v = SMIoV NIOV + SMIPRP MP/L fLOAD 
07-02-00 STS Operations 
SCIVFT MLEO 
CIOVOP - Mp/L 1LOAD 
08-00-00 Orbit Transfer Vehicle (OTV)* 
CCOTV = CCOTVPR + CCOTVOP 
08-01-00 OTV Fleet 
MSA T + MSPAST + MASE + MGEOS B 
NCFLTS f MP/L fCOTV'LOAD 
NCFLTS 
NCOTV-
 fDLCOTV
 
CCOTVPR : SCCOTV NCOTV 
MCOTV = SMCOTV NCOTV 
08-02-00 OTV Operations 
CCOTVOP : SCCOTVFLT NCFLTS 
This category refers to the Rockwell Cargo Orbit Transfer Vehicle (COTV) 
which transfers materials (delivered to LEO by HLLVs) out to the GEO 
construction base. 
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09-00-00 Personnel Module 
CPOTV = CPOTVPR + CpOTVOP 
09-01-00 Personnel 	Module Fleet
 
NROT
CEO RCONST
 
NPFLTS - f POTV
 
-
NPFLTSNPOTV- fDLPOTV
 
CPOTVPR = SCPOTV NPOTV
 
09-02-00 Personnel Module Operations
 
CPOTVOP = SCPOTVFLT NPFLTS
 
10-00-00 Facilities 
SC FACS 
CFACS = RCONST fDLFACS 
11-00-00 Taxes
 
CTXS = [Input Value] 
12-00-00 Insurance 
CINS = [Input Value] 
13-00-00 Program Management 
CpM = fPM (CSAT + CGS + CSPAST + CASE + CHLLV + 
CIOV + CCOTV + CPOTV) 
This category has been used to include the entire personnel transportation 
system. 
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14-00-00' Program SE&I 
CSEI = fSEI (CSAT + CGS + CSPAST + CASE + CHLLV + 
CIOV I CCOTV + CpOTV) 
Definitions of TFU Cost Model Variables 
Following is a listing of the definitions of the variables used in the TFU Cost 
Model of the Rockwell configuration, in the order of their initial appearance in the 
model. 
CSAT = total procurementcost of an operational satellite (5) 
CSPM 5total cost of program management for the satellite system 
total cost of systems engineering and integration (SE&I) for 
the satellite system (5 
CST = 	 total cost of the structure of the satellite system (5) 
CPS= 	 total cost of the power source of the satellite system (5) 
CANT = 	 total procurement cost of the transmitting antenna ($) 
C MISC = 	 total procurement cost of miscellaneous equipment (propul­
sion, avionics, thermal control, et al.) (5) 
CGAI = 	 total cost of ground assembly and integration (5) 
CSGTH= 	 total procurement cost of system ground test hardware (5) 
CSGT O = 	 total cost of system ground test operations (5) 
CGSE = 	 total cost of ground support equipment (5) 
COp S = total cost of operations associated with the production of 
the TFU ($) 
MSAT = total mass of an operational TFU satellite (kg) 
ST = total mass of the structure of the satellite system (kg) 
M = total mass of the power source of the satellite system (kg) 
MANT = 	 total mass of the microwave transmitting antenna of the 
satellite system (kg) 
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MMISC = 	 total mass of the miscellaneous equipment of the satellite 
system (propulsion, avionics, thermal control, et al.) (kg) 
CAST = total cost of the antenna structure ($) 
-pSST total cost of the power source structure (5) 
CMECHS : total cost of structural medhanisms Cs) 
CSEST - total cost of secondary structure ($) 
SST total mass of the structure of the satellite system (kg) 
MAST - total mass of the antenna structure (kg) 
SpSST total mass of the power source structure (kg) 
MMECHS - total mass of structural mechanisms (kg) 
MSEST = total mass of secondary structure (kg) 
SC AST - ratio of the cost of the antenna structure to the power 
throughput of the antenna power distribution system ($/kW) 
PANT PD = power input to the antenna power distribution system (kW); 
OUTP~P 

~ANT PD1 rI11 	 1RECT PD RF-DC1 BC ATM PROPROTqION PROP PC DC-RF "ANT PD 
where P2 OUT = power output at the rectenna busbar 
(kW; beginning of life, e.o.l.) 
qANT PD = antenna power distribution efficiency 
TDC-RF = dc-rf converter efficiency 
T'C = phase control efficiency 
)ION PROP = ionospheric propagation efficiency 
flATM PROP= atmospheric propagation efficiency 
TBC = beam collection efficiency 
TIRF-DC = rf-dc converter efficiency 
RECT PD = 	 rectenna power distribution efficiency (including utility interface) 
SM AST = 	 ratio of the mass of the antenna structure to the power 
throughput of the antenna power distribution system (kg/kW) 
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A 8 = area of the solar blanket 
(km 2 
P SAPD power(kW); input to the P 
solar array power distribution system 
PSAPD -RECT PD TRF-DCnBC 2ATM PROP rION PROP'PC nC-RF'ANT PD "ANT INT'SAPD 
where iANTINT = antenna power distribution efficiency 
TSAPD = solar array power distribution efficiency 
solar cell efficiency (at given concentration ratio, b.o.l.) ±sc 
F = 	 solar flux constant (1353 x 103kW/km 
2) 
nEFF = effective concentration ratio 
fSFSC = seasonal correction factor for solar flux constant 
f = environmental degradation factor for solar cells over designfED life 
fAD array design factor (includes "packing factor," that is, the -
ratio of solar cell area to total array area) 
Ac = area of solar concentrator as seen by the sun (km 
2 
CONC = efficiency of the concentrator 
SCPSST = 	 ratio of the cost of the power source structure to the 
planform area: (that is, the area a seen by the sun) of the 
solar array and concentrator ($/km) 
SM 	 ratio of the mass of the power source structure to tSePSST 	 planform area of the solar array and concentrators (kg/km) 
SC MCHS = ratio of the cost of structural mechanisms to jhe planform 
area of the solar array and concentrators ($/km) 
SMMCHS = ratio of the mass of structural mechanisms to te planform 
area of the solar array and concentrators (kg/km 
= ratio of the cost of secondary structure to Pe planform 
area of the solar array and concentrators (S/km 
SMSST= ratio of the mass of secondary structure to te planform 
area of the solar array and concentrators (kg/kmL) 
CSB= total cost of the solar blankets ($) 
CSC total cost of the solar concentrators ($)-
Ill 
CpDC 	 total cost of the power distribution and conditioning systemof the solar array ($) 
MSB = total mass of the solar blankets (kg)
 
MSC= total mass of the solar concentrators (kg)
 
MpDC = 
 total mass 'of the power distribution and conditioning system 
of the solar array (kg) 
SC B = 	 specific cost of the solar blankets (/km 2 ) 
SMSB 	 specific mass of the solar blankets (kg/kin2)-
Sc = specific cost of the solar concentrators (/ki 2
 
sc = 
 specific mass of the solar concentrators (kg/km2) 
SCcNDC = ratio of the cost of conductors and switches to the solar 
array power throughput ($/kW) 
SCsWT = 	 ratio of the cost of switching to 	the solar array powerthroughput ($/kW) 
CBATT = 	 ratio of the cost of batteries to the solar array power
throughput ($/kW) 
SCBPC 
- ratio of the cost of battery power conditioning to the solar 
array power throughput ($/kW) 
S9 SR = 	 ratio of the cost of slip rings and brushes to the antennainterface power throughput ($/kW)
 
PANT-INT 
­ power input to the antenna interface (kW);POUT 
OPANT-INT =n 
RECT PD RF-DCBC 'ATM PROP nION PROP 0PC TDC-RF ANT PD ANT-INT 
SM cNDC= ratio of the mass of conductors and switches to the solar 
array power throughput (kg/kW) 
SMSWT = ratio of the mass of switching equipment to the solar array 
power throughput (kg/kW) 
SMBATT = 	 ratio of the mass of batteries to the solar array power 
throughput (kg/kW) 
SM pC ratio of the mass of battery power conditioning equipment 
to the solar array power throughput (kg/kW) 
SM SR ratio of the massinterface power throughputof 	slip rings(kg/kW)and brushes to the antenna 
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CHP = total cost of microwave heat pipes ($) 
SCHP = ratio of the cost of microwave 
power throughput ($/kW) " 
heat pipes to the DC-RF 
PDC-RF 
PDC-RF 
= 
= 
power input to the dc-ri converters (kW); 
POUT 
qRECT PD RF-DC %tC'ATM PROP TION PROP 'PCbCRF 
M 
SMup 
= 
= 
total mass of microwave heat pipes (kg) 
ratio of the mass of microwave heat pipes 
power throughput (kg/kW) 
to the DC-RF 
CMWA = total cost of microwave antenna elements ($) 
SC MWA = ratio of the cost of the microwave 
DC-RF power throughput ($/kW) 
antenna elements to 
MMWA = total mass of the microwave antenna elements (kg) 
SMMWA = ratio of the mass of the microwave antennaDC-RF power throughput (kg/kW) 
elements to the 
SCMISC = ratio of the cost of miscellaneous equipment to the mass olthe satellite structure, power source, antenna and power 
distribution and conditioning equipment ($/kg) 
SM MISC = ratio of the mass of miscellaneous equipment to the mass of 
the satellite structure, power source, antenna and powerdistribution and conditioning equipment (fraction) 
CSUPC = total procurement cost of the satellite system 
fGAI = ratio of ground assembly and integration 
satellite system procurement cost (fraction) 
cost to the 
fSGTH = ratio of the cost of system ground test hardware 
satellite system procurement cost (fraction) 
to the 
fSGTO ratio of the cost of system ground test operations 
satellite system procurement cost (fraction) 
to the 
fGSE ratio of the cost of ground support equipment
satellite system procurement cost (fraction) 
to the 
SpM ratio of the cost of satellite system program management to 
all other TFU costs (fraction) 
fSSEI ratio of the cost of satellite system SE&I to all other TFU 
costs (fraction) 
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CGSPM = total cost of ground station program management ($)
 
CGSSEI 
- total cost of ground station SE&I (5)
 
CRECT 
- total cost of the rectenna ($)
 
CSATCON = 
 total cost of ground station satellite control faciiities 5
 
CUTINT = total cost of the ground station utility interface (5)
 
0 S&F total cost of the ground station site and facilities'($)
 
CDIPREC = total cost of the dipole/rectifier elements (5)
 
CREDPDC = total cost of rectenna power distribution and conditioning
 
equipment ($) 
SGp= total cost of the rectenna ground plane and support 
structure ($) 
SCDIPREC = specific cost of the dipole/rectifier elements ($/kW) 
PRF-DCp = power input to the RF-DC converters (kW);
 
POUT
 
PRF-DC = ni n 
RECT PD RF-DC 
SREC D 	 specific cost of the rectenna power distribution and condi­tioning equipment ($/kW) 
PRECT PD 	 power input to the rectenna power distribution and condi­
tioning equipment (kW); 
POUTERECT PD - qRECT PD 
SCGPS specific cost of the rectenna support and ground plane 
structure ($/kW) ' 
SCUTINT 
-	 specific cost of the utility interface ($/kW) 
CLP = total cost of the ground station land and preparation ($) 
CRF = total cost of the ground station roads and fences ( 
.CUT = total cost of the ground station utilities (5) 
CB = total cost of the ground station buildings (5)
 
CME = total cost of the ground station maintenance equipment ($)
 
nrL 
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fGSPM = 	 ratio of ground station program management costs to ground 
station procurement costs (fraction) 
fGSSE1 = 	 ratio of the cost of ground station SE&I to ground station 
procurement costs (fraction) 
CGROPS = total cost of ground operations Cs)
 
CSGO = total cost of satellite operations at the ground station ($)
 
CGCONST total cost of construction for satellite operations facilities
 
at the ground station ($) 
CGLOGS total cost of ground logistics for satellite operations (5) 
0OROPS = total cost of orbital operations (5) 
CCCREW = total cost of the construction crew for orbital operations ( 
CCPROV = total cost of construction crew provisions for orbital opera­
tions ($) 
CCEMS 	 total cost of expendable maintenance supplies for orbital-
oFerations (5) 
CSPA5T = total cost of the orbital assembly facilities (5) 
MSPAST = total mass of the orbital assembly facilities (kg)
 
CGSOP S = total cost of ground station system operations (5)
 
CLEOSB = total cost of the low earth orbit (LEO) space base (5)
 
CGEOSB total cost of the geosynchronous orbit (GEO) space base (5)
-
MLEOSB = total mass of the LEO space base (kg)
 
MGEOSB = total mass of the GEO space base (kg)
 
NGEO = total crew size of the GEO space base (number)
 
[Note: this input varies over the range of the expected 
value of the crew size, and the cost and mass of the 
space base are scaled accordingly, in reference to the 
point design number F below.]NGEO 
fNGEO = 	 reference point number for the total crew size of the GEO 
space base (number) 
fSHPD = 	 number of shifts per day (number) 
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fNNPS number of personnel per shift (number)
 
RCONST = satellitefleet construction.rate (number of satellites/year)
 
fDLGEO = design life of CEO space base equipment (years) 
NADM = number of airlock docking modules in the CEO space base(number) 
SCADM = unit cost of an airlock docking module Cs) 
NCHM = 	 number of crew habitability modules in the CEO space base(number) 
SC CHM = 	 unit cost of a crew habitability module (5) 
NCLM = 	 number of consumables logistics modules in the CEO space 
base (number) 
SCLM 
-	 unit cost of a consumables logistics module (5) 
NCOM = 	 number of base -management modules in the CEO space base (number) 
SCCOM 
- unit cost of a base managemnet module (5) 
NCSM = number of crew support modules with EVA unit in the GEO 
space base (number) 
SCcSM unit cost of a crew support module with EVA unit ($) 
NPOWM = number of power modules in the CEO space base (number) 
SCPOWM = 	 unit cost of a power module ($) 
NPSM = 	 number of pressurized storage modules in the GEO space 
base (number) 
ScPSM 
- unit cost of a pressurized storage module (5)
 
NSDH = number of shielding units in the CEO space base (number)
 
SCSDH = unit cost of a shielding unit ($)
 
NSM = number of crew support modules without EVA unit (number)
 
SCSM = 	 unit cost of a crew support module without EVA unit (5) 
CFIX = cost of the fabrication fixture ($)
 
SM ADM = unit mass of an airlock docking module (kg)
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SMCHM = unit mass of a crew habitability module (kg) 
SMCLM = unit mass of a consumables logistics module (kg) 
SMcoM = unit mass of a base management module (kg) 
SMCSM = unit mass of a crew support module with EVA unit (kg) 
SMPOWM = unit mass of a power module (kg) 
SMpsM - unit mass of a pressurized storage module (kg) 
SMsD H = unit mass of a shielding unit (kg) 
SMsM - unit mass of a crew support module without EVA unit (kg) 
MFIX = mass of the fabrication fixture 
NLEO = total crew size of the LEO space base (number)[Note: this input varies over the range of the expected 
value of the crew size, and the cost and mass of the 
space base are scaled accordingly, in reference to the 
point design number f 
NLEO 
below.] 
fNLEO - reference point number for the total 
space base (number) crew size of the LEO 
fDLLEO = design life of the LEO space base equipment (years) 
CASE = total cost of assembly and support equipment (5) 
NBM = total number of beam machines (number) 
SCBM = unit cost of a beam machine ( 
fDLBM = design life of a beam machine (years) 
NC = total number of cassettes (number) 
SCC unit cost of a cassette ($) 
fDLC - design life of a cassette (years) 
NCAM = total number of cable attaching machines (number) 
SC CAM = unit cost of a cable attaching machine ($) 
fDLCAM = design life of a cable attaching machine (years) 
NRM = total number of remote manipulators (number) 
SCRM = unit cost of a remote manipulator ($) 
fDLRM = design life of a remote manipulator (years) 
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NBD total number of blanket dispensers (number) 
SCBD unit cost of a blanket dispenser ($) 
fDLBD design life of blanket dispenser (years) 
N RD number of reflector dispensers (number) 
SCRD unit cost of a reflector dispenser ($) 
fDLRD = design life of a reflector dispenser (years) 
NCD = number of cable dispensers (number) 
SCD unit cost of a cable dispenser ($) 
fDLCD design life of a cable dispenser (years) 
NAPI number of antenna panel installers (number) 
SCAPI unit cost of an antenna panel installer ($) 
fDLAPI = design life of an antenna panel installer (years) 
MASE 
- total mass of assembly and support equipment (kg) 
SMBM = unit mass of a beam machine (kg) 
SMC unit mass of a cassette (kg) 
SM CAM = unit mass of a cable attaching machine (kg) 
SM RM unit mass of a remote manipulator (kg) 
SM = unit mass of a blanket dispenser (kg) 
SM RD = unit mass of a reflector dispenser (kg) 
SMcD = unit mass of a cable dispenser (kg) 
SMAPI = unit mass of an antenna panel installer 
CHLLV total cost associated with the heavy lift launch vehicle 
(HLLV) ($) 
CHLVPR 
- total procurement cost of the HLLV fleet ) 
CHLVOP = total operations cost of the HLLV fleet (5) 
MLEO = total mass launched to LEO (kg) 
COTV = total mass of the cargo orbit transfer vehicle (COTV) (kg) 
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MIOV = total mass of the intra-orbit vehicles (IOVs) (kg) 
MP/L = total mass of the payload of an HLLV to LEO (kg) 
fLOAD = average load factor for 
payload is used) 
an HLLV (what percentage of the 
fP-LV = ratio of the number of HLLV flights for eachOrbit Transfer Vehicle (POTV) flight (number) Personnel 
fROT - crew rotation rate (number of rotations per year) 
fPOTV - number of people carried per POTV flight (number) 
NHLLV = total number of HLLVs procured (number) 
fDLLV = design life of an HLLV (number of flights) 
SCHLLV = unit cost of an HLLV ($) 
SCLVFLT = cost per flight of an HLLV Cs) 
Cio= total cost of the intra-orbit vehicles (IOV) () 
CIOVPR = total procurement cost of the IOV fleet (5) 
CIOVO P = total operations cost of the IOV fleet ($) 
NIO V = total number of IOVs procured (number) 
fDLIOV = design life of an IOV (number of flights) 
SCIo= unit cost of an IOV ($) 
SM IoV = unit mass of an IOV (kg) 
SM IPRP = mass of OV propellant consumed per flight (kg) 
SCIVFT = cost per flight of an IOV ($) 
CCOTV = total cost of the COTV fleet (5) 
CCOTVPR = total procurement cost of the COTV fleet ( 
CCOTVOP total operations cost of the COTV fleet (5) 
NCFLTS = total number of COTV flights 
fCOTV - ratio of the (number) number of HLLV flights to one COTV flight 
NCOTV = total number of COTVs procured (number), 
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fDLCOTV = design life of a COTV (number of flights) 
SCcoTv= unit cost of a COTV ($) 
SM coTv = unit mass of a COTV (kg) 
SCCOTVFLT = cost per COTV flight ($) 
CPOTV 
- total cost of the POTV fleet ($) 
CPOTVPR = total procurement cost of the POTV fleet (5) 
CPOTVOP = total operations cost of the POTV fleet ($) 
NPLFTS = total number of POTV flights (number) 
NPOTV = total number of POTVs procured (number) 
fDLPOTV = design life of a POTV (number of flights) 
SCpoTv= unit cost of a POTV ($) 
SCPOTVFLT = cost per POTV flight ($) 
SCFACS = total cost of ground facilities associated with the construc­
tion of the SPS fleet (5) 
CFACS 
- total cost of ground facilities associated with the construc­
tion of a single SPS satellite ($) 
fDLFACS 
- design life of the ground facilities (number of years) 
CTXS = total cost of taxes ($) 
CINS = total cost of insurance (5) 
CPM = total cost of SPS program management (5) 
fPM 
- ratio of overall, program management cost to TFU initial 
investment cost (fraction) 
CSEI = total cost of SPS program SE&I C$) 
fSEI 
- ratio of overall program SE&I cost to TFU initial investment 
cost (fraction) 
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B.2 The O&M Cost Model of the Rockwell International Configuration 
Orbital Operations 
COROMP = NORC SCORC + MORPR SCORPR + MEMS SCEMS + 
SC ADM NOMADM. + SCCHM NOMCHM 
fDLADM fDLCHM 
SCCLM MOMCLM 5CcoM NOMCOM 
fDLCLM 
 + 1DLCSM 
Ground Operations 
CGSOM = CGSC + CGSMAT 
O&M Transportation 
MOM =MoRPR +MEMS + SMADM +NOMAD M +fDLADM 
SMCHM NOMCHM SMCLM NOMCLM 
fDLCHM 
 + 1DLCLM + 
SMcoM NOMCOM SMPSM NOMPSM 
fDLCOM + DLPSM + 
SM CSM NOMCSM 
fDLCSM
 
MOM
 
NOMCFT MPL fLOAD fCOTV
-
NOMCFT
 
NOMCV DLCTV
 
MOMCV 
- Mc~ NOMiCV
 
CM = 
 COTV NOMCF 
c OMCV- CCTVFT NOMCFT + NOM~ CSCOTV 
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+ MOMCVNOMFmomOMIFT MPL fLOAD
 
MOM + MOMCV
NOMOMCV 
MPL fLOAD 'DLIOV 
MOMIV SMIoV NOMIV 
COMIV NOMIV 
NOMLVF MOM 4MoMCv +MOMIvOMLVF MPL f LOAD 
NOMLVF 
NOMLV fDLLV 
COMLV SCHLLV NOMLV + SCLVFL NOMLVF 
N - NORCe6fROT OMPFT fPOTV
 
NO MPFT
 
OMPV f DLPTV 
COMPV = NOMPV SCPOTV + NOMPFT * POTVFT 
COMST COMLV + COMCV + COMIV + COMPV 
Total Annual O&M Cost 
COM = COROMP + CGSOM + COMST 
122 
Definitions of O&M Model 
COROMP = total cost of orbital O&M personnel (5) 
NORC = total number of O&M crew members (number) 
SCORC = annual cost per person of O&M crew members ($/person) 
MORPR = total mass of annual.O&M refurbishment procurements (kg) 
SCORPR = average specific cost of annual O&M refurbishment procure­
ments ($/kg) 
MEMS = total mass of expendable maintenance supplies (kg) 
SMaverage specific cost of expendable maintenance supply 
SCEMs materials (5/kg) 
CGSOM= total cost of ground station O&M 
CGSC = annual cost of ground station crew () 
MOM = total mass to be transported to GEO for O&M (kg) 
CGSMAT = annual cost of ground station materials (5) 
NOMADM = number of O&M airlock docking modules (number) 
NOMCH M = number of O&M crew habitability modules (number) 
NOMCLM = number of O&M consumables logistics modules (number) 
NOMCOM = number of O&M base management modules (number) 
NOMPSM = number of pressurized storage modules (number) 
NOMCSM = number of O&M crew support modules (number) 
NOMCFT = total number of COTV flights to-support O&M (number) 
NOMCV = total number of COTVs "consumed" by O&M (number) 
MOMCV total mass of COTVs "consumed" by O&M (kg) 
COMCV = total cost of COTVs "consumed" by O&M () 
NOMIFT = total number of IOV flights to-support O&M (number) 
NOMIV total number of IOVs "consumed" by O&M (number) 
MOMIV = total mass of IOVs "consumed" by O&M (kg) 
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COMIV 
NOMLVF 
NOMLV 
-
= 
= 
total cost of lOVs "consumed" by O&M (5) 
total number of launch vehicles flights (number) 
total number of. launch vehicles "cbnsumed" 
(number) 
by O&M 
COMLV 
- total cost of launch vehicles "consumed" by O&M (5) 
COMST - total cost of O&M space transportation ($) 
NOMPFT 
- total number of personnel transfer flights (number) 
N total number ofO&M (number) personnel transfer vehicles "consumed" by 
COMPV 
COM = 
total cost of personnel transfer vehicles 
O&M ($) 
total annual cost of O&M per satellite Cs) 
"consumed" by 
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APPENDIX C
 
THEORETICAL FIRST UNIT (TFU) AND OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 
(O&M) COST MODELS FOR THE BOEING CO. SPS CONFIGURATION 
The following is a listing of the equations incorporated in the TFU and O&M 
cost models of the Boeing Co. SPS configuration as described in "Solar Power 
Satellite--System Definition Study, Part III" of -March 1978. The equations are 
organized here to correspond to the structure delineated in "Satellite Power 
System Work Breakdown Structure Dictionary," NASA TM 78155, January 1978. 
Where discrepancies exist in the level of detail deeloped or- the elements 
identified between the.Boeing report and the suggested WBS structure in the NASA 
document, they have been noted, and an attempt has been made to reconcile the 
differences and to report the cost equations at the lowest possible level of detail 
corresponding to the NASA WBS structure. The definitions of the variables used in 
these cost equations have been gathered together at the end of each cost model in 
order to avoid repetition. 
It should be noted that the cost model is designed to calculate the cost of a 
single satellite. The data listed in Appendix E correspond to the TFU of the Boeing 
configuration, and therefore the cost of a single satellite calculated by the models 
listed below is for the cost of the TFU. Where costs or masses below relate to 
facilities or equipment used to construct more than one satellite, these costs and 
masses are amortized in the model so that each satellite pays an equal portion of 
the common cost. For example, in the case of the space bases, whose lifetime is 
equal to the total time required to build the SPS fleet, the cost of the space bases 
has been spread over all the satellites, such that each satellite pays an annuity at 
its IOD, the sum of all of which annuities discounted at the indicated discount rate 
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equals the present value of the space base at the lOD of the first production unit. 
Hence, any variable which corresponds the total procurement cost of equipment 
which is used for the construction of more than one satellite is the amount of the 
cost of such equipment which has been apportioned to each satellite. A similar 
amortization process has also been applied to the masses of space-based equipment 
(used for the construction of more than one satellite) for the purpose of calculating 
total transportation cost associated with the construction of more than one 
satellite) for the purpose of calculating total transportation cost associated with 
the construction of one satellite. 
C.1 The TFU Cost Model of the Boeing Co. Configuration 
01-00-00 Satellite System 
CSAT Cs S + CPS + CpODS + CMPTS + CRT + CAVS + CGAI + CSGTH + 
CSGTO + CGSE + CSPM + CSSEI 
MSAT = MSSS + MPS + MPODS + MMPTS + MAVS 
01-01-00 Structure
 
CCSSS = CAST + CPSTR + CSEST
 
MSS S = MAST + MPSTR + MSEST
 
01-01-01 Antenna Structure
 
CAST = PPAPD (SMwwPs SCMWs + SMMWST SCMWST)
 
MAST = PPAPD (SMMwPS + SMMWST) 
01-01-02 Power Source Structure 
PSAPD
 
AnEFF SSC tAD 1 ED 
MPSTR = SMPSTR AB 
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CPSTR,= SCPSTR MPSTR 
01-01-03 Mechanisms 
[Hardware elements in this category have been reported 
elsewhere.] 
01-01-04 Secondary Structure
 
CSEST = (SCcsS + SCBsuP) AB
 
MSEST = (SMcsS + SMBSUP) AB
 
01-02-00 Power Source 
Cs SCsB ABP=
M PS= SMsB AB 
[Note: This configuration has no concentrators for the solar array; 
therefore, CECOL = 0.] 
01-03-00 Power Distribution and Conditioning 
MIBJ= 1S3I3 PSAPD 
MMB = SMMB PSAPD 
MSWTG = SMSWTG PSAPD 
C PODS SCSWTG MSWTG + SCMB MMB + SCIB3. M IB 3 
01-'04-00 Microwave Antenna 
CMPTS= CMWTA + CMWPD 
MMPTS = MMWTA + MMWPD 
01-04-01 RF Generator and Beam Control 
01-04-02 Waveguides 
CMWTA = (SCTASG + SCTAPA + SCTATC + SCTACC + 
SCTAH) PDCRF 
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MMWTA = (SMTASG + SMTAPA + SMTATC + SMTACC + 
SMTAH) pDCRF 
01-04-03 Power Distribution and Conditioning 
CMWPD = (SCMWPD SMMwPP + SCMWTC SMMWTC + 
4SCMWTC SMNM\BC + SCMWSG SMMWSG) PAPD 
MMWPD= (SMMWPP + SMMWTC + SMMWSG + SMWWBC) PAPD 
01-05-00 Rotary Joint
 
MAYT = SMAYT PAINT
 
CAYT = SCAYT MAYT
 
Mj3 = MAYT + SMERT PAINT
 
CR3 CAYT + SCERJ MERJ
 
01-06-00 Propulsion
 
[Hardware elements in this category have been included elsewhere.]
 
01-07-00 Energy Storage
 
[Hardware elements in this category have been included elsewhere.]
 
01-08-00 Avionics
 
CAVS = CDM + CCM + CAC
 
MAVS= MDM + MCM +MAC
 
01-08-01 Data Mangement
 
CDM = SCMWDP PAPD + Cc
 
MDM = SMDpPAPD + Mcc
 
01-08-02 Communications and Tracking
 
CCM = CCOMM + SCMWC PAPD
 
128 
MCM - MCOMm + SMMWC PAPD 
01-08-03 Instrumentation 
[Hardware elements in this category hae been included 
elsewhere. ] 
01-08-04 Attitude Control 
CAC = CTHR + CACPP + CACIN + CACTS + CACCN + 
SCMWAC PAPD 
MAC = MTHR + MACPP + MACIN + MACTS + MACCN + 
SMMWAC PAPD 
01-09-00 Ground Assembly and Integration 
CSUPC = CSS S + CPS + CPODS + CMPTS + CRa + CAVS 
CGAI = fGAI CSUPC 
01-10-00 System Ground Test Hardware 
CSGTH = fSGTH CSUPC 
01-11-00 System Ground Test Operations 
CSGTO = fSGTO CSUPC 
01-12-00 Ground Support Equipment 
CGSE = fGSE CGSE 
01- 13-00 Satellite System Program -Management 
CSPM = fSPM (Csss + CPS + CpODS + CMPTS + CRJ + 
CAVS + CGAI + CSGTH + CSGTO + CGSE) 
01-14-00 Satellite System Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) 
CSSEI = fSSEI (Csss + CPS + CpODS + CMPTS + CRJ + CAVS + 
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CGAl + CSGTH + CSGTO + CGSE) 
02-00-00 Ground Station Systems
 
CGS = 2(CGSEC + CGSCC +CGSGI + CRE + CGSPM + CGSSE I)
 
02-01-00 Rectenna
 
CGSEC = CGSRF + CGSPD + CRPS
 
02-01-01 Dipole/Rectifier Elements 
CGSRF = (SCRFDI + SCRFCR + SCRFSC + SCREcP 
SCRFDC) PRFDC 
02-01-02 Power Distribution and Conditioning 
CGSPD = (SCGSLB + SCGSDP) PRECPD 
02-01-03 Support and Ground Plane Structures 
C ps = (SCpps + SCGSGP) PRFDC 
02-02-00 Satellite Control
 
CGSCC = CGSPC + CSOPS
 
02-03-00 Utility Interface 
CGSGI = PRECPD SCGSGI 
02-04-00 Site and Facilities
 
CRE= [input]
 
The plural "systems" is used because for this configuration there are two 
5 GW ground receiving stations for each 10 GW satellite. 
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02-05-00 Ground Station Program
 
CGSPM = fGSPM (CGsEC + CGSCC + CGSGI + CR)
 
02-06-00 Ground Station Systems Engineering and Integration
 
CGSSEI = fGSSEI (CGsEC + CGSCC + CGSGI + CRE)
 
03-00-00 Manpower Operations
 
[Costs associated with this category have been included elsewhere.]
 
04-00-00 Orbital Assembly and Support
 
CSPCN = CLCB + CGC B
 
MSPCN m
MLCB + MGC B 
04-01-00 Construction Base 
NLEO CLCBFR + CLCBCM + CLCBWM + CLCBCH + CLCBBS 
CLCB f NLEO RCONST fDLLEO 
+ CLMP 
NLEO MLCBFR + MLCBCM + MLCBWM + MLCBCH + CLCBBS 
MLCB - 1NLEO RCONST 1DLLEO 
+ MMP 
04-02-00 Logistics Base and 
04-03-00 O&M Base 
NGEO CGCBFR + CGCBCM + CGCBWM + CGCBCH + GCBB S 
CNGEO RCONST fDLGEO 
+ GM P 
+ MGCBH + GCBBSNGEO MGCBFR + MGCBCM + MGCBWM GCB iNGEO RCONST fDLGEO 
+ MGMP 
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CLI 
05-00-00 Orbital Assembly and Support 
CLSA CLEC CLPD 
RCONST DLLSA RCONST 1DLLEC RCONST 1DLLPD 
CLAS CLC 
"CONST £ DLLAS RCONST fDLLC + RCONST IDLLI 
CGSA CGEC CGPD
RCNSIDGS + 
RCONST fDLGSA RCONST fDLGEC RCONST fDLGPD 
C GAS C GC CGI 
RCONST fDLGAS RCONST fDLGC R CONST fDLGI 
M MLSA MLEC MLPD ORBHS - RCONST fDLLSH RCONST fDLLEC RCONST fDLLPD 
MLAS MLC MLI 
+ 4 
RCONST fDLLAS RCONST 1fDLLC RCONST fDLLI 
MGSA MGEC MGPD 
RCONST fDLGSA RCONST fDLGEC T fDLGPD 
MGAS MGC MGI 
RCONST fDLGAS RCONST fDLGC + RCONST fDLGI 
06-00-00 Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (HLLV) 
CHLLV = CHLVPR + CHLVOP 
06-01-00 HLLV Fleet
 
MLEO = MSAT + MSPCN + MORBAS + MOTV
 
NLVFL T MNVL p/LMLEO:L AD 
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NLVFLT
 
NHLLV- fDLLV
 
C=HLVP R = SCHLLV NHLLV 
06-02-00 HLLV Operations 
CHLVOP = SCLVFLT NLVFLT 
07-00-00 Space Transportation System (STS) and 
09-00-00 Personnel Module 
CPOTV = CPOTVPR + CPOTVOP 
07-01-00 STS Fleet and
 
09-01-00 Personnel Module Fleet
 
N GE O RfROT
 
RCONST 
NPFLTS- f1POTV
 
NPFLTS
 
NpOTV- =DLPOTV 
CPOTVPR = SCPOTV NPOTV 
07-02-00 STS Operations and
 
09-02-00 Personnel Module Operations
 
CpoTVOP = SCPOTVFLT NPFLTS 
08-00-00-Orbit Transfer Vehicle 
CSOTV = MSAT (SCSTHR + SCSOT + SCAR + SCLO X ) 
MSOTV.: MSAT (SMSTHR + SMSOT + SMAR + SM LOX ) 
This category accounts for the costs associated with the self-orbit transfer 
concept employed in the Boeing configuration. 
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10-00-00 Facilities 
SCFACS 
CFACS R CONST'DLFACS 
11-00-00 Taxes 
CTXS = [Input Value] 
12-00-00 Insurance
 
CINS = [Input Value]
 
13-00-00 Program Management
 
CPM =fPM (CSAT + CGS + CSPCN + CORBAS + CHLLV + CPOTV + CSOTV)
 
14-00-00 Program SE&I 
CSEI =fSEI (CsAT + CGS + CSPCN + CORBAS + CHLLV + CpOTV + 
CSOTV) 
Definitions of TFU Cost Model Variables 
Following is a listing of the definitions of the variables used in the TFU Cost 
Model of the Boeing configuration, in the order of their initial appearance in the 
model. 
CSAT - total procurement cost of an operational satellite (5) 
CSSS - total cost of the structure of the satellite system Cs) 
P - total cost of the power source of the satellite system (5) 
CPODS - total cost of the satellite power distribution and condi­
tioning system ($) 
CMPTS - total procurement cost of the transmitting antennae ($) 
CRJ = total cost of the rotary joints ($) 
CAVS - total cost of avionics for the satellite system ( 
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CGA I = total cost of ground assembly and integration ($)
 
CSGTH = total procurement cost of system ground test hardware ($)
 
SSGTO = total cost of system ground test operations Cs) 
CGSE = total cost of ground support equipment ($) 
CSPM () cost of program management for the satellite systemtotal 
= Stotal cost of systems engineering and integration (SE&I) for 
the satellite system ($) 
MSAT = total mass of an operational TFU satellite (kg)
 
MSSS = total mass of the structure of the satellite, system (kg)
 
M = total mass of the power source of the satellite system (kg)
 
M= total mass of the satellite power distribution and condi­
tioning system (kg) 
MMPTS = total mass of the microwave transmitting antenna of the 
satellite system (kg) 
CAST = total cost of the antenna structure (5) 
CPSTR = total cost of the power source structure ($) 
CSEST = total cost of secondary structure ($) 
SSS = total mass of the structure of the satellite system (kg) 
MAST = total mass of the antenna structure (kg) 
MPSTR = total mass of the power source structure (kg) 
MSEST -	 total mass of secondary structure (kg) 
SMMWPS = 	 ratio of the mass of microwave antennae primary structure 
to power throughput (kg/kW) 
SC MWPS 	 specific cost of the microwave antennae primary structure ($/kW) 
SM MWPS 	 ratio of the mass of microwave antennae secondary 
structure to power throughput (kg/kW) 
SCMWPS 	 specific cost of the microwave antennae secondary 
structure ($/kW) 
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PAPD = power input to the antenna power distribution system (kW); 
P TPOUT 
APD ERECT PD nRF-DC nBC 1XTM PROP ION PROP 'PC 'DC-RF 'ANT PD 
where PROUT = power output at the rectenna busbar (kW; beginning of life, e.o.l.) 
1 ANT PD = antenna power distribution efficiency 
n DC-RF = dc-rf converter efficiency 
1PC = phase control efficiency 
ION PROP = ionospheric propagation efficiency 
TATM PROP= atmospheric propagation efficiency 
n BC = beam collection efficiency 
1 RF-DC = ri-dc converter efficiency 
RETPD 
CTD 
= rectenna power distribution 
(including utility interface) 
efficiency 
AB - area of the solar blanket (kin2 ) 
PSAPD - power 
(kW); 
input to the solar 
P 
array power distribution system 
PSAPD -RECT PD'RF-DC %C 'ATM PROP'ION PROP %C bC-RF 'ANT PD 'ANT INTSAPD 
where T1ANT INT = antenna power distribution efficiency 
1SAPD =solar array power distribution efficiency 
USC- solar cell efficiency (at given concentration ratio, b.o.l.) 
F solar flux constant (1353 x 10 3kW/km 2)-
nEFF = effective concentration ratio 
fSFSC" seasonal correction factor for solar flux constant 
fED environmental degradation factor for solar cells over design- life 
-
fAD array design factor (includes "packing factor," that is, the
ratio of solar cell area to total array area), 
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SMpsTR 	 ratioplanforin mass of the power source structure toof. the 	 Searea of the solar array 	and concentrators (kg/km 
SCps.TR = 	 specific cost of the power source structure ($/kg) 
SCcSS = 	 ratio of the cost of catenary support system tolhe planform 
area of the solar array and concentrators ($/km ) 
SCBSUP = 	 ratio of the cost of the catenary support system to jhe 
planform area of the solar array and concentrators (5/km) 
= 	 ratio of the mass of the catenary su port system to the 
planform area of the solar array (kg/km) 
SMratio of the mass of tt bus supports to the planform area of 
the solar array (kg/km 
SC sB = specific cost of the solar blankets ($/km2 
SM SB = specific mass of the solar blankets (kg/km2 
MIB = total mass of the interbay jumpers (kg)
 
SM1B3 = ratio of the mass of interbay jumpers to the power
 
throughput (kg/kW) 
MMB = total mass of the main buses (kg) 
SMMB = ratio of the mass of the main buses to the power throughput 
(kg/kW) 
MSWTG = total mass of switchgear (kg) 
SMsWTG = ratio of the rriass of the switchgear to the power throughput 
(kg/kW) 
SCswTG= specific cost of the switchgear ($/kg) 
SCMB = specific cost of the main buses ($/kg) 
SC3 	 specific cost of the interbay jumpers ($/kg)-
CMWTA = total cost of the microwave transmitting arrays ($)
 
CMWPD = total cost of microwave antenna power distribution system
(5) 
MMWTA = 	 total mass of the microwave transmitting arrays (kg) 
MMWPD = 	 total mass of the microwave antenna power distribution 
system (kg) 
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SCTASG = 	 ratio of the cost of antennae structure and waveguides to 
power throughput ($/kW) 
SCTAPA 	 ratio of the cost of the transmitter power amplifiers to 
power throughput ($/kW) 
SCTATC 	 ratio of the cost of transmitter thermal control to power 
throughput ($/kW) 
SCTACC 	 ratio of the cost of phase control to power throughput($/kW) 
SCTAH = ratio of the cost of transmitter harnesses to power
throughput ($/kW) 
PDC-RF power input to the dc-rf converters (kW); 
POUT 
PDC-RF = ERECT PD 'RF-DC'BC'ATM PROP)ION PROP 7PC tDC-RF 
-SMTASG 	 ratio of the mass of antennae structure and waveguides to 
power throughput (kg/kW) 
SMTAPA = ratio of the mass of transmitter power amplifiers to power
throughput (kg/kW) 
SMTATC = ratio of the mass of transmitter thermal control to power 
throughput (kg/kW) 
SMTACC ratio of the mass of phase control equipment to power-
throughput (kg/kW) -
SMTAH = ratio of the mass of transmitter harnesses to power
throughput (kg/kW) 
SCMwPP specific cost of microwave antennae power processors ($/kg) 
SMMWPP = ratio of the mass of microwave antennae power processors 
to power throughput (kg/kW) 
SCMWTC = specific cost of the microwave power processor thermal 
control ($/kg) 
SM MWTC = ratio of the mass of microwave antennae power processor
thermal control equipment to power throughput (kg/kW) 
SCMWBC = specific cost of microwave antennae busing and cabling 
($/kg) 
SMac = ratio of the mass of microwave antennae busing and cabling 
to power throughput (kg/kW) 
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SCM-'S G = specific cost of microwave antennae switchgear ($/kg) 
SMMwsG = ratio of the mass of microwave -antennae switchgear to 
power throughput (kg/k\V-) 
MAYT = total mass of the antenna yokes and turntables (kg)
 
SMAyT = ratio of the mass of the antenna yokes and turntables to the
 power throughput (kg/kW) 
PAINT 	 power input to the antenna interface (kw); 
- POUT
 
AINTORC PDrFD TMPO)PCrC
RCT PD C ATM PROPON PROPqPC 'bC-RF 'ANT PD ANT-INT 
CAYT = total cost of the antenna yokes and turntables Cs) 
SCAYT = specific cost of the antenna yokes and turntables ($/kg) 
SM ERJ = ratio of the mass of the electrical rotary joints to the power
throughput (kg/kW) 
SCERJ specific cost of the electrical rotary joints ($/kg)
 
CDM = total cost of data management ($)
 
CCM = total cost of communications ($)
 
CAC = total cost of attitude control ($)
 
MDM = total mass of -data management equipment (kg)
 
MCM total mass of communications equipment (kg)
 
MAC total mass of attitude control equipment (kg)
-
SCMWDP = ratio of the cost of microwave antennae data processing to 
power throughput ($/kW) 
CC= "costof central computing complex ($) 
SM MWDP = ratio of the mass of microwave antenna data processing 
equipment to power throughput (kg/kW) 
Mcc total mass of the central computing complex (kg) 
CCOMM = total cost of the communications subsystem ($) 
-SCMWC 	 ratio of the cost of microwave antennae communications 
equipment to power throughput ($/kW) 
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MCOMM total mass of the communications subsystem (kg) 
SM MWC = ratio of the mass of the microwave antennae communi­
cations equipment to power throughput (kg/kW) 
CTHR - total cost of the attitude control thrusters Cs) 
CACPP = total cost of the attitude control power processors (5)
 
CACIN = total cost of the attitude control installation ($)
 
CACTS - total cost of the attitude control propellant tanks (5)
 
CACCN = total cost of the attitude control propellant feed and thrust
 
control system ($) 
SCMWAC 	 specific cost of the microwave antenna attitude control 
equipment ($/kg) 
MTHR = total mass of the attitude control thrusters (kg) 
MACPP = total mass of the attitude control power processors (kg) 
MACIN total mass of the attitude control installation (kg) 
MACTS total mass of the attitude control propellant tanks (kg) 
M = total mass of the attitude control propellant feed and thrust 
control system (kg) 
SMMWAC 	 ratio of the mass of microwave antennae attitude controlequipment to power throughput (kg/kW) 
CSUPC = 	 total procurement cost of the satellite system 
fGAI = 	 ratio of ground assembly and integration cost to the 
satellite system procurement cost (fraction) 
fSGTH = 	 ratio of the cost of system ground test hardware to the 
satellite system procurement cost (f ractiori) 
fSG.TO - ratio of the cost of system ground test operations to the 
satellite system procurement cost (fraction) 
fGSE = 	 ratio of the cost of ground support equipment to the 
satellite system procurement cost (fraction) 
fSPM 	 ratio of the cost of satellite system program management to 
all other TFU costs (fraction) 
fSSEI - ratio of the cost of satellite system SE&I to all other TFU 
costs (fraction) 
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CGSC = total-cost- of a rectenna ($)
 
CGSCC= total cost of a satellite control facility (5)
 
CGSGt = total cost of a utility interface ($)
 
CRE = total cost of site and facilities Cs)
 
CGSPM = total cost of ground station system program management (5)
 
CGSSEI = total cost of ground station system SE&I ($)
 
CGSRF= total cost of the dipole/rectifier elements for a ground
 
station ($) 
= total cost of rectenna power distribution and conditioningf r a ground station (5) 
CRPS 	 total cost of support and ground plane structure for a ground 
station ($) 
SCRDI 	 ratio of the cost of RF assembly dipoles to powerthroughput ($/kW) 
SCRFCR = 	 ratio of the cost of RF assembly circuitry to power 
throughput ($/kW) 
SCREsC = 	 ratio of the cost of RF assembly shields and covers to powerthroughput ($/kW) 
SC RECP - ratio of the cost of rectenna panels to power throughput 
($/kW) 
SCRFDC 	 ratio of the cost of RF-DC conversion units to power
throughput ($/kW) 
PRF-DC 	 power input to the RF-DC converters (kW); 
POUT 
PRF-DC = nRECT PD nRF-DC 
SCGSLB 	 ratio of the cost of ground station local busing to power
throughput ($/kW) 
ratio of the cost of ground station distributed processing to 
power throughput ($/kW) 
PRECPD power input to the rectenna power distribution system (kW); 
POUT 
PRECPD - nRECT PD 
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SC RP ratio of the cost of rectenna primary structure to power 
throughput ($/kW) 
SC GSGP ratio of the ground station planes to power throughput 
($/kW.) 
CGSPC= total cost of a ground station phase control facility ($) 
CSOPS= total ground station cost of SPS operations 
SC= ratio of the cost of grid interface provisions to powerthroughput ($/kW) 
GSPM ratio of ground station program management costs to ground
 
GS station procurement costs (fraction)
 
fGSSEI = 	 ratio of the cost of ground station SE&l to ground station 
procurement costs (fraction) 
CSPCN = 	 total cost of orbital assembly and support ($) 
CLCB = total cost of the low earth orbit (LEO) construction base ($) 
CGC B = total cost of the geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) construc­
tion base ($) 
MSPCN = total mass of orbital assembly and support equipment (kg) 
MLCB = total mass of the LEO construction base (kg) 
MGCB = total nass of the GEO construction base (kg) 
N LEO = total crew size of the LEO space base (numberfNote: 
 this input varies over the range of the expected
 
value of the crew size, and the cost and mass of the
 
space base are scaled accordingly, in reference to the
 
point design number 	fNLEO below.]
 
f = 	 reference point for the total crew size of the LEO spacefNLEO base (number) 
fDLLEO = design life of the LEO space base equipment (years) 
RCONST = satellite fleet construction rate (number of satellites/year) 
CLCBRF = total cost of LEO space base framework ($) 
CLCBC M = total cost of LEO space base crew modules ($) 
CLCBWM - total cost of LEO space base work modules ($) 
= o toal cst 	 (5LE spae bae wrk mdule 
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CLCBCH 	 total cost of LEO space base cargo handling anddistribution equipment 	($) 
CLCBBS = total cost of LEO space base subsystems (
 
CLMP = total cost of LEO space base maintenance provisions (
 
MLCBFR = total mass of the LEO space (kg)
 
MLCBCM = total mass of the LEO space base crew modules (kg)
 
MLCBWM. = total mass of the LEO space base work modules (kg)
 
MLCBCH = total mass of the LEO space base cargo handling and
 
distribution equipment (kg) 
MLCBBS = total mass of the LEO space base subsystems (kg) 
MLMP = total mass of LEO space base maintenance provisions (kg) 
NGEO = total crew size of the GEO space base (number) [Note: 
 this input varies over the range of the expected
 
value of the crew size, and the cost and mass of the
 
space base are scaled accordingly, in reference to the
 
point design number 	fNGEO below.]
 
fNGEO 	 reference point number for the total crew size of the GEO 
space base (number) 
fDLGEO = 	 design life of GEO space base equipment (years) 
CGCBFR = 	 total cost of the GEO space base framework ($) 
CGCBCM = 	 total cost of the GEO space base crew modules Cs) 
CGCBWM = 	 total cost of the GEO space base work modules ($) 
CGCBCH = total cost of the GEO space base cargo handling and 
distribution equipment (5) 
CGCBBS = total cost of the GEO space base subsystems (5) 
CGMP = total cost of the GEO space base maintenance provisions ( 
MGCBFR = total mass of the GEO space base framework (kg) 
M	GCBCM total mass of the GEO space base crew modules (kg) 
GCBWM = total mass of the GEO space base work modules (kg) 
-MGCBCH 	 total mass of the GEO space base cargo handling and 
distribution equipment (kg) 
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CGI 	 total cost of GEO space base indexers ($) 
fDLGI 	 design life of GEO space base indexers (years) 
MLSA = 	 total mass of LEO space base structural assembly equipment 
(kg) 
MLEC 	 total mass of LEO space base energy conversion installation 
equipment (kg) 
MLPD total mass of LEO space base power distribution installation 
equipment (kg) 
MLAS total mass of LEO space base antenna installation 
equipment (kg) 
MLC = total mass of LEO space base cranes and manipulators (kg) 
MLt : total mass of LEO space base indexers (kg) 
MGSA = total mass of GEO space base structural assembly 
equipment (kg) 
MGEC total mass of GEO space base energy conversion installation 
equipment (kg) 
MGPD total mass of GEO space base power distribution installation 
equipment (kg) 
MGAS total mass of -GEO space base antenna installation 
equipment (kg) 
MCC total mass and manipulators (kg)G of GEO space base cranes 
MGI = total mass of GEO space base indexers (kg) 
0 HLLV - total cost associated with the heavy lift launch vehicle 
(HLLV)($) 
CHLVPR = 	 total procurement cost of the HLLV fleet ($) 
CHLVOP = 	 total operations cost of the HLLV fleet ($) 
MLEO = 	 total mass launched to LEO (kg) 
NLVFLT = 	 total number of HLLV flights required (number) 
MP/L = 	 total mass of the payload of an HLLV to LEO (kg) 
fLOAD = 	 average load factor for an HLLV (what percentage of the 
payload is used) 
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NHLLV = 	 total number of HLLVs procured (number 
fDLLV : design life of an HLLV (number of flights) 
SCHLLV = unit cost of an HLLV ($) 
SCLVFLT - costper flight of an HLLV ($) 
MGCBBS = total mass of the GEO space base subsystems (kg) 
CORBAS total cost of orbital assembly and support equipment ($)-
CLSA 	 $totalcost of LEO space base structural assembly equipment 
f DLLSA = 	 design life of LEO space base structural assembly equipment 
(years) 
CLEC 	 total cost of LEO space base energy conversion installation
equipment ($) 
fDLLEC = design life of LEO space base energy conversion installation 
equipment (years) 
CLPD = total cost of LEO space base power distribution installation 
equipment ($) 
fDLLPD design life of LEO space base power distribution installation 
equipment (years) 
CLAS 5total cost of LEO space base antenna installation equipment 
fDLLAS design life of LEO space base antenna installation 
equipment (years) 
CLC = total cost of LEO space base cranes and manipulators (5) 
f1 DLLC = design life of LEO space base cranes and manipulators 
(years) 
CLI = total cost of LEO space base indexers ( 
fDLLI = design life of LEO space base indexers (years) 
CGSA = total cost of GEO space base structural assembly equipment 
fDLGSA 	 design life of GEO space base structural assembly
equipment (5) 
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CGEC = 	 total cost of GEO space base energy conversion 
installation equipment ($) 
fDLEC 
-	 design life of GEO space base energy conversion installation 
equipment (years) 
CGp D = 	 total cost of GEO space base power distribution installation 
equipment ($) 
fDLPD 
-	 design life of GEO space base power distribution installation 
equipment ($) 
CGAS 
-	 total cost of GEO space base antenna installation equipment(s)
 
fDLGAS 
- design life of GEO space base antenna installation 
equipment (years) 
CGC 
-	 total cost of GEO space base cranes and manipulators C$) 
fDLC = design life of GEO space base cranes and manipulators 
(years) 
CPOTV = total cost of the POTV fleet C$) 
CPOTVPR = total procurement cost of the POTV fleet ($) 
CPOTVOP 
- total operations cost of the POTV fleet ( 
NPLFTS = total number of POTV flights (number) 
fROT = 	 crew rotation rate (number of rotations per year) 
fPOTV - number of people carried per POTV flight (number)
 
NpOTV 
- total number of POTVs procured (number)
 
1DLPOTV 
- design life of a POTV (number of flights)
 
SCPOT = unit cost of a POTV (5)
 
SCPOTVFLT = cost per POTV flight C$)
 
CSOTV 
-	 total cost of self-orbit transfer (5) 
SCSTHR = 	 ratio of the cost of self-orbit transfer thrusters to total 
satellite mass ($/kg) 
SCSOT 	 ratio of the cost of self-orbit transfer propellant tanks to 
satellite mass ($/kg) 
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SCAR ratio. of cost of' argon 
satellite mass ($/kg) 
propellant for self-orbit transfer to 
SCLOX = ratio of the cost of chemicaltransfer to satellite mass ($/kg) propellant for self-orbit 
SMsTHR ratio of the mass of 
satellite mass (kg/kg) 
self-orbit transfer thrusters to the 
SMsoT ratio of the mass of self-orbitthe satellite mass (kg/kg) 
transfer propellant tanks to 
SMAR ratio of the mass of the argon propellant 
transfer to the satellite mass (kg/kg) 
for self-orbit 
SMLOX ratio of the mass of chemical propellant 
transfer to the satellite mass (kg/kg) 
for self-orbit 
SCEACS = total cost of ground facilities associated with the construc­ion of the SPS fleet ($) 
C=ACS total cost of ground facilities associated with the construc­
tion of a single SPS satellite ($) 
fDLFACS - design life of the ground facilities (number of years) 
CTXS = total cost of taxes ($) 
CINS - total cost of insurance 
CPM = total cost of SPS program management ($) 
fPM - ratio of overall program management
investment cost (fraction) 
cost to TFU initial 
GSEI 
f1 SEI 
= 
= 
total cost of SPS program SE&I ($) 
ratio of overall program SE&I cost to TFU initial investment 
cost (fraction) 
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C.2 The O&M Cost Model of the Boeing Co. Configuration 
Personnel
 
(NORC SCORC)
 
OMC 
- INSOM 
O&M Equipment Cost 
9
 
CME= NOMi COMi CCH
1=1 fDLOMi + DLCH 
O&M Space Transportation Cost
 
MOME N M
 
m~ IN 0 m1 OMi
1=1 fDLOMi 
SNORC MCH 
MOM = MCPM + fNSOM 1 DLCH 
NOMPPT - NORC fROT
 
fPOTV
 
NOMPFT 
N OMPV fDLPTV 
COMPV NOMPV SCPoTV + NOMPFT POTVFT 
M OM
 
NOMCFT COTV 
NOMCV NOMCFTDLCTV 
mOMCV SMCOTV NOMCV 
COMCV- COTVFT NOMCFT + NOMCV SCCOTV 
NOMLVF MOM +MOMCV +MOME 
MPL 1LOAD 
NOMLV NOMLVF 
148 
COMLV 
COMST 
= 
-
SCHLLV NOMLV + SCLVFL NOMLVF 
COMLV" + COMGV + COMPV 
Total Annual O&M 
CaM = COMC + COME + COMST 
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Definitions of O&M Model 
COMC - total cost of O&M personnel (5) 
NORC = total number of orbital O&M personnel (number) 
SCORC = annual cost per O&M crew member ($/person) 
F NSOM number of (number) satellites maintained by a single O&M base 
COME = total cost of O&M equipment (s) 
N number of maintenance gantry and manipulation units 
(number) 
NOM 2 = number of crew module docking ports (number) 
NOM 3 = number of crew buses (number) 
NOMq - number of crane manipulators (number) 
NOM 5 = number of component transporters (number) 
NOM 6 = number of turntables (number) 
NOM 7 = number of laser annealing units (number) 
NOMS = number of gantry/repair vehicles (number) 
COMI = unit cost of a maintenance gantry and manipulation units ($) 
COM2 = unit cost of crew module docking ports ($) 
COM3 = unit cost of crew buses (5) 
COM4 = unit cost of crane manipulators (5) 
COM5 = unit cost of component transporters ($) 
COM6 = unit cost of turntables ($) 
COM7 = unit cost of laser annealing units (5) 
COM8 = unit cost of gantry/repair vehicles ($) 
fDLOM1 - design life of maintenance gantry and manipulation units 
(years) 
fDLOM2 design life of crew module docking ports (years) 
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fDLOM3 = design life, of crew buses (years) 
fDLOM4 - design life of crane manipulators (years) 
fDLOM5 = design life of component transporters. (years) 
fDLOM6 = design life of turntables (years) 
fDLOM7 = design life of laser annealing units (years) 
fDLOMS = design life of gantry/repair vehicles (years) 
CCH = unit cost of an O&M crew habitability module ($) 
fDLCH - design life of an O&M crew habitability module (kg) 
MOME = total mass of O&M equipment (kg) 
MOM 1 = unit mass of maintenance gantry and manipulation units (kg) 
MOM 2 = unit mass of crew module docking ports (kg) 
MOM 3 = unit mass of crew buses (kg). 
MOM 4 = unit mass of crane manipulators (kg) 
MOM 5 = unit mass of component transporters (kg) 
MOM 6 = unit mass of turntables (kg) 
MOM 7 = unit mass of laser annealing units (kg) 
MOM = unit mass of gantry/repair vehicles (kg) 
MOM = total mass of O&M material to GEO (kg) 
MCPM = mass of annual refurbishment components for a single SPS 
satellite (kg) 
MCH = mass of an O&M crew habitability module (kg) 
NOMPPT = total number of personnel transfer flights (number) 
N OMPV= total number of personnel transfer vehicles "consumed" by 
O&M (number) 
CaOMP = total cost of personnel transfer vehicles "consumed" by 
O&M ($) 
N OMCF T = total number of COTV flights to support O&M (number) 
NOMCV = total cost of COTVs "consumed" by O&M (kg) 
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fDLCTV = design life of a cargo orbit transfer vehicle (number of 
flights) 
MOMCV = total mass of COTVs "consumed" by O&M (kg) 
SCcoTV= unit cost of a cargo orbit transfer vehicle (number of 
flights) 
COMCV total cost of COTVs "consumed" by O&M Cs)-
COTVFT = cost per flight of a cargo orbit transfer vehicle ($/flight) 
NONLVF total number of launch vehicle flights to support .O&M 
(number) 
N total number of launch vehicles "consumed" by O&M 
(number) 
COMLV = total cost of launch vehicles "consumed" by O&M ($)
-
COMST = total cost of O&M space transportation ($) 
COM total annual O&M cost per satellite ($)-
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APPENDIX D
 
ESTIMATES OF THE CURRENT STATE-OF-KNOWLEDGE AND
 
STATES-OF-KNOWLEDGE AT PROGRAM DECISION POINTS
 
FOR THE ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CONFIGURATION
 
The current state-of-knowledge relative to the Rockwell configuration is 
reflected by the ranges of input variables to the risk analysis model. These ranges 
have been subjectively assessed and are given in Table D.1 for the TFU cost model 
and in Table D.2 for the O&M cost model. Table D.2 lists only those O&M cost 
model inputs whose values are not already listed in Table D.I. The current 
state-of-knowledge corresponds to Decision Point A (DPA) in the Rockwell SPS 
Development program analyzed in Section 2. It -should be noted that the date for 
DPA is given as 1980 because no experimentation that might reduce uncertainty on 
any of the listed cost model elements is likely to occur before then. 
The sources for these input data are the "Satellite Power Systems (SPS) 
Concept Definition Study" final report of April 1978, prepared by Rockwell 
International for the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center under NASA Contract 
.NASS-32475 and numerous telephone conversations and two series of meetings with 
Rockwell International personnel. 
The states-of-knowledge at the decision points of the SPS development plan 
proposed by Rockwell have been subjectively assessed and are also shown in 
Table D.1. The numbers shown represent the percent reduction in uncertainty (that 
is, the range) in each variable over the state-of-knowledge today. These 
improvements in the states-of-knowledge derive from work that is scheduled 
during each branch of the respective decision trees. The variables for which a dash 
is indicated have been treated as deterministic in the analysis conducted to date. 
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It has also been assumed in this analysis that the state-of-knowledge relative to 
operation and maintenance costs does not change from the present state-of­
knowledge until the IOD of the first unit at which time all uncertainty disappears. 
--
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TABLE 0.2 ESTIMATES OF THE CURRENT STATE-OF-KNOWLEDGE ON O&M COST
 
MODEL INPUTS FOR THE ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CONFIGURATION
 
INPUT ELEMENT VARIABLE NAME BEST 
RANGE OF VALUES 
MOST LIKELY WORST 
TOTAL NUMBER OF O&M CREW 
MEMBERS 
NORC NUMBER * 285 * 
ANNUAL COST PER PERSON OF O&M 
CREW MEMBERS 
SCORC S/PERSON * 62500 * 
TOTAL MASS OF ANNUAL O&M 
REFURBISHMENT PROCUREMENTS 
MORPR kg 1.2 x 106 1.498 x 106 2.2 x 106 
AVERAGE SPECIFIC COST OF ANNUAL 
O&M REFURBISHMENT PROCUREMENTS 
SCORPR S/kg 5.00 5.52 8.50 
TOTAL MASS OF EXPENDABLE 
MAINTENANCE SUPPLIES 
M 
EMS 
kg 800 x 103 832200 900 x 103 
AVERAGE SPECIFIC COST OF 
EXPENDABLE MAINTENANCE SUPPLY 
MATERIALS 
SCEMS S/kg 3.00 3.75 5.00 
ANNUAL COST OF GROUND STATION 
CREW 
CGSC $ 100 x 103 114 x 103 250 x 103 
ANNUAL COST OF GROUND STATION 
MATERIALS 
CGSAT $ 75 x 103 100 x 103 200 x 103 
NUMBER OF O&M AIRLOCK DOCKING 
MODULES 
NOMAUM NUMBER * 4 * 
NUMBER OF O&M CREW HABITABILITY 
MODULES 
NOMCXM NUMBER * 1 * 
NUMBER OF O&M CONSUMABLES 
LOGISTICS MODULES 
NONCM NUMBER * 1 * 
NUMBER OF O&M BASE MANAGEMENT 
MODULES 
NONCOM NUMBER * I * 
NUMBER OF PRESSURIZED 
STORAGE MODULES 
NOMPSM NUMBER * 1 * 
NUMBER OF O&M CREW SUPPORT 
MODULES 
NOMCSM NUMBER 1 
o O
 
159 
APPENDIX E
 
ESTIMATES OF THE CURRENT STATE-OF-KNOWLEDGE AND
 
STATES-OF-KNOWLEDGE AT PROGRAM DECISION POINTS
 
FOR THE BOEING CO. CONFIGURATION
 
The current state-of-knowledge relative to the Boeing configuration is 
reflected by the ranges of input variables to the risk analysis model. These ranges 
have been subjectively assessed and are given in Table E.I for the TFU cost model 
and in Table E.2 for the O&M cost model. Table E.2 lists only those O&M cost 
model inputs whose values are not already listed in Table E.I. The current 
state-of-knowledge corresponds to Decision Point A (DPA) in the Boeing SPS 
Development programs analyzed in Section 2. It should be noted that the date for 
DPA is given as 1980 because no experimentation that might reduce uncertainty on 
any of the listed cost model elements is likely to occur before then. 
The sources for these input data are the "Solar Power Satellite System 
Definition Study" final report of March 1978, prepared by Boeing Co. for the 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center under NASA Contract NAS9-15196 and numerous 
telephone conversations and two series of meetings with Boeing Co. personnel, 
headed by Mr. Gordon Woodcock. 
The states-of-knowledge at the decision points of the SPS development plan 
proposed by Boeing have been subjectively assessed and are also shown in 
Table E.1. The numbers shown represent the percent reduction in uncertainty (that 
is, the range) in each variable over the state-of-knowledge today. These 
improvements in the states-of-knowledge derive from work that is scheduled 
during each branch 6f the respective decision trees. The variables for which a dash 
is indicated have been treated as deterministic in the analysis conducted to date. 
It has also been assumed in this analysis that the state-of-knowledge relative to 
160 
operation and maintenance costs does not change from the present state-of­
knowledge until the IOD of the first unit at which time all uncertainty disappears. 
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